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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

ADDRESS TO THE
LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

BY
WILLIAM E. COLBY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

MAY 3, 1974



FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICA

Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in America. One of our earliest national heroes, Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our first President, General Washington, was an assiduous director and user of intelligence. Intelligence has changed in recent years, however, and today its reality is different from its traditional meaning. In the common understanding, intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying. But what I would like to talk about tonight is the way we in America have changed the scope of the word "intelligence," so that it has come to mean something different from that old-fashioned perception. These changes have stemmed from characteristics peculiar to America and from the nature of our society.

The first and most dramatic change in today's meaning of the word "intelligence" stems from the technological genius of Americans. We have applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and of our scientists. In the short space of eighteen years since the U-2 began its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence. In 1960 this country engaged in a great debate as to whether there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Today the facts are so well established that such a debate is impossible. Then we had to try to deduce from bits of circumstantial evidence how many missiles the Soviets had; today we see and count them. We wondered then what new missiles the Soviets might be developing; today we follow their tests and determine from them the range, the size, and the effectiveness of such missiles.

This technical contribution to intelligence not only provides a better basis for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Over the years such limitation treaties were always stopped by one essential feature: the United States needed some assurance that the other party would abide by a treaty's restraints. Thus we came up with the "open skies" proposal and tried to negotiate on-site inspection procedures. The Soviet leaders rejected these because they believed such measures would permit foreigners an undue degree of

It was only after American intelligence developed the ability to monitor such agreements from afar, through technical means, that we on our side became sufficiently confident to begin the process of mutual arms limitation. In the text of the first SALT agreement, intelligence in fact was even admitted to polite diplomatic society under the name of "national technical means of verification."

Technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in many other ways beyond those I just described. They provide a precision to our knowledge of the world around us, which was inconceivable fifteen years ago. I might add that I give full credit to the many talents here in California which have contributed immensely to this effort.

The second major contribution America has made to intelligence stemmed in part from a bad American habit. This was our habit of disbanding our intelligence machinery at the end of every war, requiring us to reassemble one hastily at the beginning of a new war. Thus we abandoned intelligence in the period after World War I, when Secretary of State Stimson is alleged to have commented that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." We disbanded the Office of Strategic Services in October 1945, only to establish a new central intelligence apparatus to help meet the Cold War in 1947.

This habitual exercise provided something new in 1942. We were faced then with the urgent need to provide intelligence support to our governmental and military leadership about such disparate areas of the world as the North African littoral, the "hump" between China and India, and distant Pacific islands. General William Donovan, our first director of central intelligence, mobilized the talents of academia and industry to assemble every possible American source of information on these subjects.

This central pool of intellectual talent proved its worth and provided the base for the second major American contribution to the intelligence profession. While certainly the collection of information is vital to intelligence, an equally vital contribution comes from the analysis, assessment, and estimating process. The analytic staff within the Central Intelligence Agency has access to all the raw information on foreign areas available to our Government, ranging from that which is completely public to the most secret products of our worldwide collection apparatus. It subjects this information to the intellectual talents and experience of its membership, which in scope and scholarship can rival those of our large universities. It then produces objective and reasoned assessments of developments around the world and projections of likely future trends.

Some of the work of this corps of experts has come to light through the revelation of the Pentagon Papers, in which the various national estimates on Vietnam were shown to have been independent, objective assessments of the likely future course of events there. This is not the time or place to debate American involvement in Vietnam and the many factors which influenced it; I mention these reports only to demonstrate what this assessment process can contribute: an independent and objective assessment of a foreign situation, unaffected by political commitments or departmental parochialism.

As has been reported in the press, I have made certain changes in the bureaucratic structure through which these assessments are produced, but the estimating process in its essentials remains as it was. I hope I have even reinforced it by my own insistence that honest differences among the experts must be fully reflected in our final output rather than concealed

under useless generalizations.

America's success in this assessment process perhaps influenced the formation by the Soviets a few years ago of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. The Soviets apparently have recognized, as we did long ago, that it is as important to study and try to understand American society as it would be to spy on it. While some other nations also consider assessment a part of their intelligence process, I know of none which can match the investment we in America have made in research and analysis as an integral element of our intelligence mechanism. The product delivered to our policy-makers has often demonstrated the value of this investment, and opened new perspectives for the concept of intelligence.

American intelligence presents another unique feature. It must operate within the tradition of an open society in America. But, as General Washington once noted, "upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises" of intelligence. These principles are not easily reconcilable, and we are breaking new ground in intelligence doctrine as we try to resolve the dilemma between them.

Part of our solution to this problem appears in the National Security Act of 1947, providing that CIA have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions, i.e., that it is restricted to foreign intelligence. This limitation is clearly recognized among our employees, although my predecessors and I have candidly admitted that CIA made mistakes with respect to the wig and other equipment and the psychological profile provided to the Watergate "plumbers." I am confident and have assured the Congress publicly that it will be respected in the future.

The 1947 Act recognized the other horn of our dilemma when it charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. It is this charge that led my predecessors and me to take such Constitutional steps as are possible to retain the essential secrets of intelligence. In this respect we have at least one common interest with the profession of journalism: we are both interested in the protection of our sources.

We are currently engaged in the courts in an effort to enforce the secrecy agreement that one of our ex-employees signed when he came to work with us. In it he acknowledged that he would be receiving sensitive information and agreed to hold it secret unless we released it. We are not objecting to most of a book he proposed to write, even including about half of the items that we initially identified as technically classified. We are struggling, however, to prevent the publication of the names of a number of foreigners, publicity which could do substantial injury to individuals who once put their confidence in us. Similarly, we hope to withhold the details of specific operations where exposure could prevent our receipt of further information of great value. In some cases, the publication of the fact of our knowledge of a situation can be of major assistance to another nation in deducing how we must have learned of it and shutting us off from it. I might add that we do not censor our ex-employees' opinions. We have cleared several such books full of criticism, in which the authors have been careful not to reveal our sources or operations. The most serious aspect of this struggle is that if we cannot protect our sources and methods, friendly foreign officials and individuals will be less forthcoming with us in the future, when it could be of critical importance to our country. No serious intelligence professional has ever believed that General Washington's maxim could be replaced by a variation of the Wilsonian approach to covenants, or "open intelligence openly arrived at."

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Another unique aspect of American intelligence is our relationship to

the Congress. Some of my foreign counterparts around the world display considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation. Many of them would never be subjected to detailed scrutiny by their Parliament, and their identities are frequently totally unknown. Some months ago, for example, two journalists were prosecuted in Sweden—hardly a closed society—for revealing the startling fact that their country had an intelligence service. In our country our intelligence authority stems from an act of Congress, it is subject to oversight by the Congress, and it depends upon funds appropriated annually by the Congress.

The Congress has provided for itself a way of resolving the dilemma between the need for secrecy in intelligence and the demands of our open society. Those Senators and Congressmen designated to exercise oversight of CIA or review its budgets are fully informed of our activities, inspect us at will, and are given detailed and specific answers to any questions they raise. Other individual Senators and Congressmen and other committees frequently receive the same intelligence assessments of the world situation as are provided to the Executive Branch, on a classified basis, but they are not provided the operational details of our intelligence activities. This arrangement was established by the Congress and is, of course, subject to change. My own position is that the method by which Congress exercises its oversight of intelligence activity is a matter for the Congress to decide.

As a related aspect of American intelligence in this open society, I might say something about our relations with the public and the press. We do not conduct a public relations program; we are not in the public information business. But we do make as much information as possible available to the news media and to the public. Groups of our citizens, including high school students, have visited our facilities, where we try to respond to their questions about the nature of American intelligence.

Thus we in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be an intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations. At the same time, we must respect the essential professional requirement embodied in the National Security Act to protect our intelligence sources and methods. We will consequently continue to arouse wonderment from some of our foreign associates as to our openness, and concern among some American citizens that we still must keep some information secret if we are to conduct an intelligence effort at all.

Technical intelligence, the intellectual process of assessment, and our exposure to our Constitutional authorities and the public are three major contributions America has made to the intelligence profession. I do not want to be accused, however, of concealing the fact that intelligence still requires clandestine activity. Our technical intelligence and our study and assessment of material openly available throughout the world have certainly revolutionized the intelligence profession in the past twenty years. But they have not removed the needs of our national policy-makers for information on the intentions of other powers. They have not removed the need to identify at an early stage research abroad into some new weapon which might threaten the safety of our nation, so that we do not become aware of a new and overpowering threat, especially from a nation not as open as ours, too late to negotiate about it or to protect ourselves.

The need for clandestine collection can perhaps be illustrated by comparing the task facing me with that facing Mr. Andropov, the head of the KGB in the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of easily acquired information about America from published and public

sources. Out of this, he must pick those facts which are significant and assemble them into an accurate assessment of America. My task is to search for individual facts kept in the utmost secrecy in closed societies, and with these few facts try to construct whole assessments, in somewhat the way one extrapolates a reproduction of the skeleton of a *Brontosaurus* from a thigh bone. Without the contributions of clandestinely acquired information, our *Brontosaurus* could in some situations be very deformed indeed.

Simple prudence, of course, causes us to use clandestine collection only when the information is available in no other way and is of real value to our country. My point is that such situations do exist. Thus we will continue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to undertake clandestine intelligence missions. I might add only that we must do a better job of training future generations of American intelligence officers and agents than Nathan Hale received in a one-day briefing and the advice to place his reports in his shoes.

From this description we see that intelligence in today's complicated world is a complex affair. It must warn our Government of new generations of intercontinental missiles being developed, it must be attentive to foreign economic threats to America's strength and well-being, and it must identify political problems around the world which can adversely affect our interests. The very complexity of the challenge has led to the active collaboration of all the different elements of the American Government which can contribute to the process of information collection and national assessment. President Nixon has charged my predecessors and me with the leadership of this Intelligence Community and has provided certain interdepartmental mechanisms through which to implement this charge. This charge of leadership for the entire American intelligence process applies to the substance of our intelligence needs and to the resources devoted to intelligence. It puts on me the responsibility of preventing separate bureaucratic interests from impinging on the effectiveness or raising the cost of our national intelligence effort.

This then is foreign intelligence in and for America today. It reflects the technical and intellectual talents of America, it reflects our open society, it reflects the courage and integrity of our professional intelligence officers. Most important of all, it provides American policy-makers with critical information and reasoned assessments about the complex foreign political, economic, and military challenges to our national security and welfare. It is designed to help us to achieve and to live in peace, rather than only to protect us in time of war. It has become an important and permanent element of our national foreign policy structure. We Americans who are a part of it are proud of it, and of the improvements we Americans have brought to a profession which can be traced at least to Moses, who sent a man from each tribe to "spy out" the land of Canaan.

Thank you very much.

C.I.A., Bruised by Vietnam and Watergate, Undergoes Quiet Changes Under Colby

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6 — Bruised by the domestic politics of the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate affair, its influence in the White House broken by the practitioners of détente, the Central Intelligence Agency is undergoing a major, perhaps fundamental, transformation.

Its claws—the covert operations that once marshaled large mercenary armies in Laos and Latin America and toppled undesired governments in Iran and Guatemala—are now largely retracted.

Its weightiest organ in the bureaucracy, the Board of National Estimates, a federal court of intelligence, has been abolished.

Under its new director, William E. Colby, some of the agency's functions and priorities have been shifted, with seemingly paradoxical results.

Although President Nixon has given Mr. Colby more power and responsibility than most of his predecessors, the director has markedly less access to the White House.

Based on Nine Interviews

While he may not face as much rivalry from the military intelligence establishment as some critics feared, Mr. Colby's agency is being challenged by the State Department's intelligence and research bureau, newly revitalized at Secretary of State Kissinger's behest.

These changes, which by the nature of the intelligence profession have taken place quietly, became known through interviews in the intelligence community.

The rules of the game requires that there be no attribution of information acquired from high intelligence officials. When Mr. Colby sees newsmen—he has done so more frequently than any of his predecessors since he took over last summer—he requests that not even the terms "officials" or "sources" be used.

The mandate given Mr. Colby by the President provides him not only the power to preside over all intelligence operations, but also the power to allocate the entire intelligence budget of about \$6-billion.

Even tactical intelligence, previously an activity jealously maintained by the military services, comes under his purview.

Impelled by apparent failures of Israeli tactical intelligence during the October war, American intelligence officials have decided to place greater stress on relaying information on the de-

ployment of opponent forces to field commanders in West Germany and South Korea.

But the most striking changes in the Central Intelligence Agency have come at the top, having been initiated by Mr. Colby himself.

He replaced the 10-man Board of National Estimates and its staff of 20 last October with a system manned by what he calls national intelligence officers.

Founded in 1950 by Walter Bedell Smith, and run originally by the Harvard historian William Langer, the board in its heyday had been an "independent corporate entity," in the description of a former member. It produced long-range estimates of the intentions and capabilities of antagonists.

"I felt the board was essential to doing honest intelligence," this retired member continued. "It was impossible for the White House to order up something that fit their views. It was impossible then, but it's possible now."

The new 11 national intelligence officers are expected to range through the entire government and beyond to put together their evaluations.

Each has a geographic region or a topical area, among them the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Japan and the Pacific, Latin America, Europe, strategic forces, Central purpose forces, economics and energy.

More Short-Term Studies

The new officers are preparing more short-term assessments and fewer long-range estimates. This is partly in response to the demands of their chief consumer, Secretary of State Kissinger.

"It's ad hoc-ism," said an agency official. "The old board could respond to a request for an estimate in five days or 24 hours. But it didn't like to. We used to schedule the work three to six months in advance."

Explaining why he believes the change was necessary, even though regrettable, the official went on:

"The board couldn't have gone on. It was in a helluva rut. It thought in big strategic terms and didn't get into gubby details. It was often too general and philosophical. Also its profound skepticism on Vietnam didn't help the board in this town."

"Besides, Henry Kissinger is hopelessly antibureaucracy. He wants his intelligence handed to him scribbled on the back of an envelope."

An aide of Mr. Kissinger remembers the old blue-covered national estimates as "blah—they ended up with the least common denomi-

nator."

The new estimates carry dissenting views from within the intelligence community as an integral part of their texts. In the old system dissents were registered as footnotes.

Key Military Man Hired

A concern voiced by Mr. Colby's critics is that the military intelligence establishment, which makes up more than four-fifths of the intelligence community, may simply overpower the agency and its independent civilian views.

The preponderance of the military, even after the Congress slashed 9,000 people from the Defense Intelligence Agency last year, does not worry Mr. Colby.

He hired Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham, a defense intelligence specialist who had greater military control over military intelligence. General Graham is now Mr. Colby's liaison man within the intelligence community.

"You've got the fox in the chicken coop," said a critic.

But a former C.I.A. official who now works for State Department intelligence commented:

"I always thought the threat of the military was terribly exaggerated. It assumes that civilians are a bunch of dummies. I never found that the civilians were willing to roll over and play dead. They were always willing to challenge."

In addition to General Graham, Mr. Colby has appointed an admiral as his national intelligence officer on conventional forces. The Board of National Estimates usually had two or three former admirals and generals.

Mr. Colby is satisfied with his system because he feels it has ruled out institutional differences with the military and made remaining differences a matter of factual appraisals rather than opinions.

Rarely Sees President

Although he appears to have established his authority firmly under Mr. Nixon, he hardly ever sees the President. Under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the Director of Central Intelligence called at the White House almost every week.

Mr. Colby is on the telephone almost daily with the President's aides and he seems to feel comfortable with this arrangement, believing that his counterparts, Mr. Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, have not much more time with Mr. Nixon than he does.

In the year since he has taken charge, Mr. Colby has let it be known that he wants the agency to concentrate on what he believes are new priorities—international trade, cultural relations and the monitoring of international agreements to reduce arms and armies.

To this end the agency continues to maintain agents in American companies engaged in foreign trade and in journalism, with perhaps 500 of 6,000 agents using the cover of businessman or reporter.

Mr. Colby, who spent most of his career with the agency in covert operations, is intent on keeping that capability. Even if it is being applied only sparingly.

"It is like keeping an aircraft carrier," said a man who believes in the value of covert operations. "You have it."

But there are lunchtime debates among the agency's senior officials about the value of maintaining the planes, the weapons and the trainers that were associated with the secret armies.

"It doesn't seem to go with Nixon's idea of constructing world peace," said one official.

State Department's Role

"It needs to be diminished very considerably," said another. "We are not in a position nor is it worthwhile to try influencing the course of action in every other country. There are also the budgetary realities."

Mr. Kissinger apparently has also given some thought to reducing the size of the covert operations establishment, according to one of his aides in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

The bureau, under William G. Hyland, has become more active and does much analysis work for Mr. Kissinger, with results that are said to please him.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 June 1974

Parts of the Book Censored by the C.I.A.

Following are excerpts from a forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Mr. Marchetti worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for fourteen years as a Soviet-military specialist and executive assistant to the deputy director. Mr. Marks was an analyst and staff assistant to the intelligence director in the State Department.

The book has been at the center of a legal dispute between the authors; the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, and the C.I.A. A Federal court order permitted the agency to inspect the manuscript of the book. The C.I.A. deleted 339 passages, but later reinstated 171 after the publisher and the authors started litigation against the agency.

A Federal judge cleared for use 140 passages, plus parts of two others, but continuing legal appeals made them unavailable for inclusion in the book. Both sides submitted written briefs to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District. Oral arguments were heard June 3 and a ruling is pending.

*In these excerpts—and in the rest of the book—boldface type represents original C.I.A. deletions that the agency later reinstated. The word **DELETED** represents deletions the agency refused to reinstate. In all, there were 168 deletions.*

THE CIA is big, very big. Officially, it has authorized manpower of 16,500, and an authorized budget of \$750 million—and even those figures are jealously guarded, generally made available only to Congress. Yet, regardless of its official size and cost, the agency is far larger and more affluent than these figures indicate.

The CIA itself does not even know how many people work for it. The 16,500 figure does not reflect the tens of thousands who serve under contract (mercenaries, agents, consultants, etc.) or who work for the agency's proprietary companies.* Past efforts to total up the number of foreign agents have never resulted in precise figures because of the inordinate secrecy and compartmentalization practiced by the Clandestine Services. Sloppy record-keeping—often deliberate on the part of the operators "for security purposes"—is also a factor. There are one-time agents hired for specific missions, contract agents who serve for extended periods of time, and career agents who spend their entire working lives secretly employed by the CIA. In some instances, contract agents are retained long after their usefulness has passed, but usually are known only to the case officers with whom they deal. One of the Watergate burglars, Eugenio Martinez, was in this category. When he was caught inside the Watergate on that day in June 1972, he still was receiving a \$100-a-month stipend from the agency for work apparently unrelated to his covert assignment for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The CIA claims to have since dropped him from the payroll.

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DELETED

) In actual practice, however, whatever damage was caused by the chemical was quickly repaired by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

The agency's other discovery was a weapons-detection system. It worked by spraying a special chemical on the hands of a suspected Vietcong and then, after a few minutes, shining an ultraviolet light on his hands. If the chemical glowed in a certain manner, that meant that the suspect had held a metal object—in theory, a weapon—during the preceding twenty-four hours. The system's main drawback was that it was just as sensitive to steel farm implements as to guns and it could implicate a person who had been merely working with a hammer. The CIA considered the system such a success, however, that it passed it on through a domestic training program to the police forces of several American cities,

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) Latin America in 1954 was the scene of one of the CIA's greatest paramilitary triumphs—the successful invasion of Guatemala by an agency-organized rebel force. And it was in Latin America that the CIA seven years later suffered its most notable failure—the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. But the agency was slow to accept defeat in the Cuban operation. The only reason for the failure, the CIA's operators believed, was that President Kennedy had lost his nerve at the last minute, refusing more air support for the invasion and withholding or reducing other possible assistance by U.S. forces. Consequently, the agency continued its relationships with its "penetrations" of Cuban exile groups—in a way reminiscent of its lingering ties with Eastern European émigré organizations from the early Cold War period. And the CIA kept many of the Bay of Pigs veterans under contract, paying them regular salaries for more than a decade afterward.

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) Time after time, the Cuban government would parade CIA-sponsored rebels before television cameras to display them and their equipment to the Cuban public and the world. Often the captives made full confessions of the agency's role in their activities.

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WORKMEN had already started to put the White House Christmas decorations in place on a December day in 1969 when the President met in the Cabinet room with the National Security Council. The (

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) out to the interested parts of the federal government the previous April, bureaucrats had been writing posi-

tion papers to prepare their chiefs for this meeting. There was sharp disagreement within the government on how hard a line the United States should take with the (

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) Now the time for decision-making was at hand, and those present included the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Under Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

* Admiral Thomas Moorer, the newly named Chairman of the JCS, was attending his first NSC meeting in this capacity. The President noted the occasion by introducing him to all assembled as "Admiral Mormon."

The President opened the session by stating that the NSC had before it some very complex problems—complex not only in the usual foreign-policy sense but also in a moral context which, the President noted, concerned a large portion of the American population. Nixon then turned to his DCI, Richard Helms, and said, "Go ahead, Dick."

The NSC meeting had officially begun, and, as was customary, Helms set the scene by giving a detailed briefing on the political and economic background of the countries under discussion. Using charts and maps carried in by an aide, he described recent developments in southern Africa. (His otherwise flawless performance was marred only by his mispronunciation of "Malagasy" [formerly Madagascar], when referring to the young republic.)

Next, Henry Kissinger talked about the kind of general posture the United States could maintain toward the (**DELETED**) and outlined the specific policy options open to the President. In the case of (

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* Some of the statements were quite revealing. Early in the meeting Secretary of State William Rogers jokingly pointed out, to general laughter in the room, that it might be inappropriate for the group to discuss the subject at hand; since some of those present had represented southern African clients in earlier law practices. Vice President Spiro Agnew gave an impassioned speech on how the South Africans, now that they had recently declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around, and he went on to compare South Africa to the United States in its infant days. Finally, the President leaned over to Agnew and said gently, "You mean Rhodesia, don't you, Ted?"

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) the United States to do so. To what extent Helms' arguments played a part in the presidential decision can be answered only by Richard Nixon himself. But, the following year, at the request of the British, the United States did and its (

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) was' such an established factor that it was not even under review at the NSC meeting.

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NEW YORK TIMES

9 June 1974

C.I.A. CHIEF SEEKS SECRECY POWERS

Wants Law for Enforcing
Intelligence Protection

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 8 — William E. Colby, the director of Central Intelligence, is seeking legislation that would give him powers to enforce the protection of intelligence secrets and provide a penalty of 10 years in prison or a fine of \$10,000 for violations.

The request, accompanied with a three-page draft of a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, was sent out to Nixon Administration officials and Congressional leaders on Jan. 14.

But it became public knowledge only when it was issued last Monday by the United States Court of Appeals in Richmond, appended to a brief submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency in a still running battle over secrecy powers.

The genesis of Mr. Colby's request is in his court struggle with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publishers of the soon to be distributed book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks.

Mr. Marchetti was a C.I.A. employee from 1955 to 1969 and the book draws heavily on his experience and knowledge of agency operations.

Last September Mr. Colby, who had just taken over as director of Central Intelligence and head of the agency, sought court assistance to require 339 deletions of what he and his associates considered to be classified and highly sensitive information. The proposed deletions total almost 100 pages of the 530-page manuscript.

Set Limit of 27

After a series of court encounters between the C.I.A. and Knopf and the authors—much of the time being spent in closed sessions—Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. ruled in the United States District Court in Alexandria, Va., that only 27 passages could and should be properly deleted.

The case is now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, and Mr. Colby evidently intends to fight it to the end because he feels the C.I.A. would be naked without the power to enforce its secrecy oath upon employees and former employees.

Upon acceptance in the C.I.A., new employees are now required to sign a paper committing themselves to refrain from passing on intelligence secrets, even after leaving the agency. But the Marchetti case has shown that at least some courts are unwilling to uphold the validity of these oaths by applying penalties or restraining orders or injunctions against publishing.

Mr. Colby has explained that he decided to seek the new legislation to give him the muscle to enforce the C.I.A.'s secrecy and intelligence classification regulations.

Authority Defined

The draft bill for amendment of the National Security Act, prepared by C.I.A. legal experts, proposes that the Director of Central Intelligence be "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." It would give the director authority over employees of the Government, members of the armed forces and contractors of the Government as well as their employees insofar as they come into contact with secrets.

It would further give the C.I.A. chief the power to define the "intelligence" in question and defines those subject to prosecution as only those "authorized" to receive such information. Others would be immune from prosecution.

In addition, it provides for court procedures "in camera"—that is, closed to the public—to review intelligence cases brought up by the director. Finally, it provides for injunctions to prevent acts such as publication of the Marchetti book.

A C.I.A. spokesman emphasized in a telephone interview that the draft bill was by no means the last word on the subject, and, indeed, the request has been shuffled between the Office of Management and Budget and the Justice Department ever since it was first submitted almost five months ago.

7/15
JULY 1974

CIA Cost Disclosure Bid Killed

Associated Press

The Senate has refused to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose publicly each year the total amount of money America spends on spying.

Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., was voted down, 55-33, yesterday on his public disclosure amendment to the \$21.8 billion weapons procurement authorization bill.

ALSO REJECTED, 55-27, was an amendment by Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., to authorize a \$100 million grant and loan fund to help defense contractors to convert their plants and employees to civilian work as defense contracts expire.

He has offered similar proposals every year since 1966, when the Vietnam war was in full swing, and all have been defeated.

The Senate approved, 76-12, an amendment by Sen. Hubert Humphrey, D-Minn., to forbid the armed forces from testing poisonous gases, germ and chemical warfare agents and radioactive materials on dogs.

HUMPHREY SAID the Army's Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland recently advertised for 450 beagle puppies to continue evaluation of toxic substances despite widespread public protests.

"I suggest that the Department of Defense take a greater interest in rats, and let the dogs alone," he asserted.

Proxmire's CIA budget disclosure amendment was opposed by members of a 22-man Senate-House special CIA Oversight Committee made up of senior members of the House and Senate appropriations and armed services committees.

Chairman John C. Stennis, D-Miss., of the Armed Services Committee said disclosure could give U.S. adversaries, present and future, "the working tools to blueprint to a degree United States intelligence activity."

"WE MIGHT AS WELL abolish the agency," he said.

66 The only blatantly sexist recruiting practices I found were in the CIA 99

Currently I am a candidate for a Ph.D. in Economics. During the past few months I have been in contact with private, academic, and government organizations concerning openings for economists. Since the federal government has been forcing affirmative action programs on various organizations, I found it ironic that the only blatantly sexist recruiting practices I found were in a government organization, the Central Intelligence Agency.

During an interview with a representative of the CIA's personnel office, I was informed by the interviewer that "they" were worried about me, since they assumed that my career was secondary to my husband's and they did not want to spend money processing my application if all of my current and future employment decisions would be dependent on my husband's job. When I tried to explain that my husband and I both felt that my profession was the more specialized and that I would find a job first, and he would look for a job in that geographic area, the interviewer made the snide remark, "famous last words."

Since the job of research economist consisted partly in becoming an expert on various economic problems all over the world, I thought it only reasonable that travel to those parts of the world would be included in the job. When I asked about the possibilities of travel, I was given an extensive lecture on how dangerous the world was and how they could

not allow a young woman with family responsibilities (a son and a husband) to travel away from home. When I asked if a young man with a wife and son would be allowed to travel, the interviewer answered, "We don't send young mothers to Uganda." Thus the interview ended.

The next step in the CIA's recruiting process consists of a three-and-a-half-hour battery of tests. The first two and a half hours consisted of standardized verbal and mathematical aptitude tests. The last hour was devoted to a vocational aptitude and preference test which was supposedly designed to determine the fitness of the candidate for a long-term career with the CIA. When the test was handed out, I was shocked to see that men and women were receiving different tests—those for men had a blue cover; for women, a pink cover! I was asked: "Do you prefer household magazines or fashion magazines?" "Would you rather be the wife of a research scientist or the wife of a rancher?" "Would you rather spend a lot of time putting on makeup or go out without makeup?" "Would you rather cook or sew a dress?" I failed to see how these questions were relevant or useful in determining my suitability as a research economist.

Needless to say, I do not intend to pursue my employment opportunities with the CIA. I only hope that in the future all government agencies will take affirmative action seriously.

B. Jennine Anderson
Charlottesville, Va.

Chairman John L. McClellan, D-Ark., of the Appropriations Committee, said disclosure of the intelligence budget total would lead to demands for explanations and details.

"If you end all the ignorance, you end national security," he asserted.

The Senate adopted by

voice vote an amendment by Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., declaring it the sense of Congress that defense budgets should not be padded to stimulate the domestic economy, and requiring the secretary of defense to tell Congress within 30 days how much of next year's \$85.6 billion budget is intended for that purpose.

NEWS AMERICAN, Baltimore
26 May 1974

Scandal Helps Some U.S. Agencies

By DAVID BARNETT
News American Bureau

WASHINGTON — "There's no question," concedes White House speechwriter Patrick J. Buchanan, "the Watergate has been a massive distraction."

But distraction does not mean inaction. Don't get the idea that all the wheels of government in Washington are in a state of suspended animation.

Tax refund and Social Security checks still flow out of the computers by the millions. You can still get a passport with reasonable speed. Civil servants are still sifting over federal parking spaces.

Veterans' benefits seem to be fouled up and the Postal Service has not yet cleaned up the mail mess, but attributing these ills to Watergate is a little like blaming Linda Lovelace for original sin.

It is true that, despite the beauty of the capital in the spring, the Watergate smog

has made Washington more a pleasant place to visit than a work base for high-quality, potential government policy makers. About one-fifth of the supergrades — the policy-making administrative posts — are vacant.

And the intensity of the White House's tunnel vision on the impeachment process has resulted in less rigid direction of policy development.

When Roy Ash, director of the Office of Management and Budget, called recently on the departments to provide a quick list of innovative policy ideas for White House consideration, he got a bundle of re-treads and mush.

But in the departments with strong cabinet secretaries — State, Defense, Transportation and Health, Education and Welfare — the post-Watergate sense of independence from the White House may be a plus.

Transportation Secretary Claude S. Brinegar, for instance, will fight for his new

idea — concentration of all mass rail transit funds in the few cities where they can count — more in the halls of Congress than in the back rooms of the Executive Office Building.

Brinegar last week even publicly conceded he was "shocked, offended and discouraged" by the Watergate "mess" — words that would have cost him his head a year ago.

Many career employees in other departments, such as Labor and Commerce, are in a state of waxy flexibility, waiting to see who the eventual top dog will be. But others are busily reworking programs and ideas that might eventually be sold to the Ultimate boss, even if that means the position papers and charts stay in the files until after the 1978 election.

In agencies most burned by the Watergate scandal, the experience has put more steel in the spines of the high level

technicians.

At the Central Intelligence Agency, the technicians finally balked at giving more help to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt when Hunt asked them to supply him with a secretary and an answering service in New York City.

But for a month they had supplied him with help because the White House said Hunt was doing a national security job.

If the White House made such a request now, a knowledgeable source says, "The agency would explode from the inside."

Even CIA Director William Colby has changed his ways as a result of the Watergate disclosures.

He has had ripped out the sensitive recording equipment that permitted CIA directors for years to record conversations in their offices.

And it was much better equipment than the recorders used in the White House oval office.

WASHINGTON STAR
4 June 1974

Senate Favors Limitation on CIA

United Press International

The Senate has voted to close a loophole in the CIA charter that was cited last year to justify the agency's help to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

An amendment by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., to the 1975 military budget bill would insert the word "foreign" before every reference to intelligence in the CIA's charter, and di-

rect the agency to report to Congress on all duties assigned to it by the National Security Council.

The amendment was accepted by Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis, D-Miss., after Proxmire deleted language that would have barred the CIA from providing any assistance to police without the written approval of congressional oversight committees, and the full Senate

accepted the amendment on a voice vote.

Proxmire said hearings before the Watergate committee and the House and Senate armed services committees had shown "a number of misuses of CIA authority." Among them, he said, were the provision of false credentials, disguises, a camera and other equipment to Hunt and Liddy who used them during the break-in at the office of

Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

The agency's former director, Richard Helms, justified the aid to Hunt as part of a National Security Council mission assigned to CIA.

Until Helms testified, it had been generally assumed in Congress that the CIA was concerned exclusively with foreign intelligence.

5 June 1974

8 JUN 1974

Subversive Groups List Is Abolished

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Staff Writer

With little fanfare and no evidence of nostalgia, the Nixon administration yesterday abolished the 27-year-old Subversive Organizations List.

Attorney General William B. Saxbe called it a "vestigial tail" of the government's security programs.

The list, written in the post-war trauma in the late 1940s primarily as a defense against Communist front organizations, contains the names of 300 organizations that various attorneys general have designated as subversive.

All but about 30 have been out of business for five years or more and some of those are so loosely organized that they are barely existent, a Justice Department official said.

Moreover, constitutional challenges have eroded the list's usefulness to the point where only one agency—the Defense Department—still uses it regularly in screening prospective employees.

In 1951, the Supreme Court ruled that no organization could be added to the list without being granted a hearing. Twenty years later, President Nixon delegated the Subversive Activities Control Board to determine which groups should be on the list, but the board no longer exists.

No new names have been added to the list since 1955, and several have been removed as the result of lawsuits.

"It is now very apparent it [the list] serves no useful purpose," Saxbe said.

The Attorney General said the most serious failing of the 1947 executive order by President Truman establishing the list is that [it] permitted the Department of Justice to assemble it without the considerations for due process that were later ordered by the Supreme Court.

"If the list serves no other purpose now, it should continue to be a reminder that whatever we do must be fair and in full accord with the law and the protections it affords to all," the Attorney General said.

Mr. Nixon's order revoking the list specifies that it will not be used, published or circulated by any government agency for any purpose. The Justice Department said existing copies will be destroyed.

The most widely known or-

ganizations on the list include the Communist Party U.S.A., the Socialist Workers Party and the Ku Klux Klans of America.

It also includes groups that have long since disbanded, including the German American Bund, the Black Dragon Society and the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy.

Also included are the Rising Sun Flag Society (a group of Japanese war veterans); the Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts); the Croatian Benevolent Fraternity, and the Sakura Kai (Russo-Japanese War veterans).

The Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims and the Maurice Braverman Defense Committee are groups that supported a Baltimore lawyer, Maurice Braverman, who was convicted, disbarred and imprisoned in 1952 for violating the anti-subversive Smith Act.

Braverman recently was reinstated to the Maryland bar after a long legal struggle.

Those who have obtained court orders removing them from the list include the Independent Socialist League, the Association of Lithuanian Workers and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, whose members were Americans who fought for the Spanish republic against Gen. Francisco Franco.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin T. Maroney said that of the government agencies surveyed in a recent study, only the Defense Department responded that the list "did have some utility." Defense officials, Maroney said, used it as an "investigative device in background checks."

Asked whether the abolition of the list was motivated by constitutional considerations or is lack of practical usefulness, Maroney said, "If there had been no constitutional problems, we probably would have deferred to the Defense Department."

However, Maroney pointed out that since last year the loyalty section of the standard government employment application has been revised to be more precise about the "quality" of an applicant's membership in a subversive group at the time he belonged.

The form now inquires whether the applicant was ever a member of the Communist Party or any other group "which during the period of your membership you knew was advocating . . . that the government . . . should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means."

Ghosn Zogby, USIA Aide In Ceylon in the Sixties

Ghosn J. Zogby, 59, a former public affairs officer for the U.S. Information Agency, died of cancer Thursday at Sibley Memorial Hospital. He lived on Veazey Street NW.

Mr. Zogby attended the American University of Beirut and earned a bachelor's degree from Syracuse University. He rose from private to captain in the Army during World War II, and after the war served with the military government in Germany.

He joined the State Department in 1950, specializing in Arab affairs. His posts abroad included consular attache in Istanbul and first secretary and political officer in Beirut.

Mr. Zogby later joined USIA and in 1965 was appointed public affairs officer in Ceylon. He retired in the late 1960s.

He leaves his wife, Helen; a sister and a brother.

Mass will be said at 10



GHOSN J. ZOGBY

a.m. Monday at St. Ann's Catholic Church, 4001 Yuma St. NW. Burial will be in Parklawn Memorial Park.

The family suggests that expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to the American Cancer Society.

Use of the question in that form will continue, even though government agencies will not be permitted to refer to the Subversives List, Maroney said.

Moreover, he said, the FBI still has 52 organizations actively under investigation and it will continue its surveillance of them.

Saxbe said that personnel security programs will "naturally" be continued in all federal agencies.

The study that led to yesterday's presidential order was begun last year by then-Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson, but was not yet completed when Richardson resigned last October.

TIME, JUNE 10, 1974

Nixon's Date with the Supreme Court

"Dragging out Watergate drags down America."

—Richard Nixon, March 19

Despite repeated assurances that the President wants a prompt, thorough investigation, the White House has fought blatantly and with marked success to drag out Watergate, to stall the impeachment process by every possible means. Nixon's lawyers last week maneuvered in court to slow the case and kept stonewalling against the House Judiciary Committee's request for more evidence, to which it is entitled under the Constitution. The committee's impeachment timetable continued to slip badly.

At the same time, Nixon seized the welcome opportunity to escape from Watergate into the world. He announced with understandable satisfaction Henry Kissinger's diplomatic coup in the Middle East. The President planned to capitalize on this major achievement by preparing a grand triumphal tour of the Middle East, probably beginning next week, to be followed by another trip to Moscow. While the Middle East tour is unnecessary in any practical sense, it would dramatize America's reviving leadership in an area where it had long been losing ground.

There is a rhythm in the history of Watergate. Periodically, the President has managed to stem the tide of investigation and indignation, partly because of his own tactics, partly because of sheer fatigue among his critics and in the country. But inevitably something would occur to weaken his cause further, and that seemed to be happening again last week when, on Friday, the Supreme Court dealt a sharp blow to Nixon's defense. The court announced that it would take the unusual step of bypassing the circuit court of appeals in order to speed a final decision on whether the President had the right to withhold 64 tapes from Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski. While the short-run impact on the pace of the Rodino committee's work was unclear, the week's events may well have defined the outer limits of the President's ability to string out the proceedings.

I. THE CRUCIAL RULING

There was remarkably little disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices in making their decision to grant Jaworski's petition (entitled *United States of America v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, et al.*) to take immediate jurisdiction over the tapes case. Written briefs are to be filed by June 21 and arguments will be given on July 8. A decision would presumably be rendered a week or two later.

The Justices were apparently persuaded by Jaworski's appeal that the issues involved in the case were "of imperative public importance." Among the main issues now to be decided, according to the Jaworski brief: 1) whether the President is subject to normal judicial process; 2) whether he or the courts have final authority over what evidence can be excluded from judicial proceedings on grounds of Executive privilege; 3) whether Executive privilege can be claimed in a criminal case; 4) whether the President had effectively waived privilege in the Watergate affair by his

own selective release of evidence; and 5) whether Judge John Sirica's order that Nixon must comply with the Jaworski subpoenas was proper.

In opposing Jaworski's petition for bypassing the appeals court, Presidential Consultant Charles Alan Wright agreed that the issues were "exceedingly important" but argued in vain that this only meant that the dispute must "be decided wisely" rather than "hurriedly." Warning against any "rush to judgment," Wright's brief cited the irritation of the Justices when they were pushed into quicker than normal decisions. In one instance, a "rushed decision" was later reconsidered by the court and changed. The Justices, however, apparently saw an overriding public duty to act with dispatch this time. Another consideration: the court would have put itself in a highly unfavorable light if it had adjourned until the fall while so important a case remained unresolved.

Ostensibly, this first Watergate case to reach the Supreme Court deals only with procuring evidence in the criminal trial of seven former Nixon agents charged with conspiring to conceal the origins of the Watergate burglary. But even the White House brief conceded that "intrinsically related matters" are involved in the impeachment inquiry.

Nixon's unprecedentedly lavish use of the claim of Executive privilege—based on the theory that he can only get candid advice from aides if he keeps their conversations with him confidential—is at the core of his defense. Obviously, if the Supreme Court rules that Nixon's claim of Executive privilege to protect his tapes is not valid in the criminal case of his former associates, it would have no validity at all in the transcending circumstances of impeachment.

In the criminal case, Jaworski wants the tapes both for prosecution purposes in the trial and to comply with the right of defendants to have access to any evidence held by the Government that would tend to help their defense. Jaworski thus is not bound by any need to protect the secrecy of grand-jury proceedings. He might be free to give it to the Rodino committee voluntarily—or certainly if asked or subpoenaed to do so.

It is likely that the court will rule against Nixon and that soon after his return from the Soviet Union in July he will face a no-win choice: surrender tapes that are widely assumed to be incriminating to him, or ignore an order of the highest court. Either move would hasten impeachment. Refusal to comply would leave him in direct defiance of both the Legislative and Judicial branches of Government. "He'd be impeached and impeached fast," said Illinois Republican Tom Railsback, a member of the Judiciary Committee. While Nixon once had promised to comply with any "definitive" Supreme Court decision, without explaining what he meant by the term, his aides will not renew even that vague pledge now. Such refusal to acknowledge that the President "is subject to the rule of law" last week was termed "shocking" by Chesterfield Smith, president of the American Bar Association.

II. THE ELLSBERG CASE

Another judicial showdown was expected this week over Nixon's refusal to supply White House files to his former aides, Charles Colson and John Ehrlichman, who are among five men charged with conspiracy in the burglary of the office of a psychiatrist consulted by Pentagon Papers Defendant Daniel Ellsberg. Federal Judge Gerhardt Gesell had sternly warned the President's lawyer, James St. Clair, that the documents must be produced or he might have to dismiss the case. Gesell expressed strong suspicion that Nixon might be deliberately acting to get the case thrown out by withholding the evidence, and he ordered St. Clair to find out if that was the President's intention.

Responding in writing last week, St. Clair contended that "the President is not desirous of having these, or, in fact, any indictments of former governmental officials dismissed without a full and fair trial." Nevertheless, wrote St. Clair, Nixon may withhold some such documents on the basis of national security, even if this leads to dismissal. St. Clair offered a vaguely worded proposal under which Colson, Ehrlichman and their lawyers could inspect the files at the White House and indicate which documents they wanted produced for their defense. Nixon would then decide what to release. Whether the special prosecutor's staff also could inspect these files and select incriminating material, or could only see documents which the President had approved, was not clear.

It seemed unlikely that Gesell would accept this procedure as proposed after oral arguments in his court this week. He has already ruled that the security argument cannot be used as a defense in the case. There may indeed be valid national-security secrets in some of the documents sought by the defendants, but Gesell wants to be able to pass on the relevancy of such information to the trial. It would be a huge paradox, not to say injustice, if Nixon's former aides escaped trial because he would not release evidence, while others who have cooperated with prosecutors and already pleaded guilty go to jail.

III. THE COMMITTEE SLOWDOWN

The House Judiciary Committee completed its closed-door staff briefings on the Watergate cover-up, and some members sounded uncertain about the evidence. "The hearings on Watergate ended with a thud rather than a crescendo," observed Presidential Counselor Dean Burch. No member of the Judiciary Committee claimed that the evidence cleared Nixon of involvement in the cover-up. But several Congressmen said that the evidence fell well short of proof of guilt. "It most assuredly is not an overwhelming case," declared Republican Charles Wiggins, a consistent Nixon defender.

Most Democrats, however, saw a prima-facie case against the President, at least in the taped remarks directing the payment of hush money to Watergate Conspirator E. Howard Hunt. Only in a trial must guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt, according to pro-impeachment committee members. The Rodino committee was in

agreement, however, that the President was openly defying its authority and preventing its conclusive determination of his Watergate role by withholding pivotal evidence. Eight (out of 17) Republicans joined all but one of the committee's Democrats in voting, 28 to 10, to dispatch a sharp letter of protest to Nixon. It warned that "it is not within the power of the President to conduct an inquiry into his own impeachment, to determine which evidence, and what version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and necessary to such an inquiry." Committee members may draw "adverse inferences" from his withholding of evidence, the letter said, and might conclude that such refusal "constitutes a ground for impeachment." The vote indicated a deterioration in Nixon's position, since a similar but weaker protest letter was approved five weeks ago along nearly straight party lines.

Dull Show. Spurning a White House request, Republicans also joined in keeping the committee's staff briefings closed until all the basic evidence is presented. St. Clair had urged that the hearings be opened to television coverage. The motives on both sides were diverse. Televised hearings would doubtless move even more slowly than the closed sessions. Both St. Clair and many committee members feel that the briefings presented by Counsel John Doar and Albert Jenner—as opposed to the interrogation

quickly bore a television audience. St. Clair argues that the hearings are not "substantial" and would not hurt Nixon's case, while leaks of information are unfair to his position. Still retaining control of the committee, Chairman Rodino intends to pursue inquiries into such areas as the ITT and milk price support controversies in closed meetings.

While the committee's general course now seems clearer, its timetable has slipped badly. Originally, it had hoped to complete its work by the end of April; now late August seems the earliest possible period for sending its report to the House. That would still allow the House ample time in the current session to either approve or reject articles of impeachment.

If the House does vote such articles, however, there might not be enough time remaining to complete a trial in the Senate. Although the matter is in some dispute, the predominant parliamentary interpretation in Congress is that the Senate, as a continuing body, could start a trial in the current session and conclude it in the next. There is ample precedent for that.

Of greater significance than the parliamentary situation is the political impact of such a drawn-out process. TIME Congressional Correspondent Neil MacNeil detects a subtle shift in the mood of the House Republican lead-

ership. It apparently stems from a vague feeling that Nixon may have "bottomed out" after widespread criticism of his released transcripts, is now recovering, and might yet survive. One sign of the change was Republican Leader John Rhodes' complaint that the Judiciary Committee ought to stop chasing tapes and call witnesses to pin down any uncertainties in the evidence it already holds. Earlier Rhodes had been among the Republicans suggesting that Nixon might have to consider resignation.

If the impeachment vote in the House falls after the election, both lame-duck Congressmen and those safely re-elected will feel freer to vote their consciences rather than worry about their constituents' reaction. The incoming Senate probably will have fewer Republican members than the present one, to Nixon's disadvantage.

Long before the end of the current congressional session, however, the Supreme Court will have ruled on Nixon's claims of Executive privilege. If his position is supported, the impeachment inquiry may be thwarted in its quest for the full Watergate story. The criminal cases against Nixon's aides also might have to be dismissed. If the court rejects Nixon's claims, on the other hand, the criminal trials will proceed—and the President's strategy of survival by stonewalling will be effectively demolished.

TIME, JUNE 17, 1974

Four Walls Close In on Nixon

Whatever psychic relief and favorable publicity are generated by the President's foreign travels, they cannot stop or even slow the machinery that threatens the Nixon presidency. Last week, as Nixon prepared to go abroad, Capitol Hill and Washington courtrooms produced only bad news for him.

The House Judiciary Committee began to climb out of its rut and seemed ready to quicken the march toward impeachment. Charles Colson, a former member of Nixon's innermost circle, confessed his criminality and professed a desire to tell all that he knows about Watergate. It was revealed that a federal grand jury had named the President as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate cover-up case—the first official citation of direct criminal association ever brought against a U.S. President. Adding to Nixon's judicial problems, a federal judge openly threatened to cite him for contempt of court. Last week's major actors and their roles:

I. RODINO PROMISES ACTION

Alarmed at the President's previous success in slowing the impeachment inquiry by withholding evidence, House Speaker Carl Albert summoned Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino and urged him to push on despite that obstacle. Rodino replied that the committee was gaining momentum and should meet a target date of July 15 for taking its vote. That would be a month earlier than predicted two weeks ago. The House would then have time to decide the issue by Labor Day. If impeachment is voted—current estimates show a pro-impeachment margin of at least 70 members in the House—the Senate trial could begin in September.

Albert and other Democratic House leaders suggested that Rodino could avert any dilatory tactics by Nixon Law-

yer James St. Clair if the committee completed its closed-door staff presentation of evidence and then voted without calling witnesses. "St. Clair could keep every witness on the stand for three days," one top Democrat warned. But Rodino replied that Republicans on the committee will insist that such witnesses as John Dean, Charles Colson, John Ehrlichman, H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman and John Mitchell be called and tested under cross-examination. Rodino advised that this should be permitted, but that tight controls, including a one-day limit for each witness, should be imposed.

Key Democrats on the committee have advised party leaders that a Judiciary vote in favor of impeachment is now all but certain. "We've got enough to impeach the guy now," said one Democrat. "We're putting together a fail-proof case." TIME has learned that the committee staff has begun to prepare articles that will accuse the President both of offenses that are indictable in criminal practice and of broader violations that deal with a President's particular legal responsibilities. Each article will be accompanied by evidence of specific Nixon actions to support the charge.

The thrust of the six articles—which are still subject to change—is that Nixon has 1) failed to execute faithfully the laws of the U.S., 2) failed to fulfill other constitutional responsibilities, 3) subverted the Constitution, 4) participated in an obstruction of justice, 5) participated in the subordination of perjury and 6) defied the Congress in its proper constitutional authority and is in contempt of the Congress.

II. COLSON CONFESSES GUILT

No one seemed more surprised than Presidential Counsel St. Clair when David Shapiro, the attorney for Charles

Colson in the Ellsberg burglary case, stepped up behind him in Judge Gerhard Gesell's courtroom and confided: "We're going to plead guilty to one count of obstructing justice." Incredulous, St. Clair asked Shapiro to repeat the statement. He did. A St. Clair aide, John McCahill, hurriedly borrowed a dime from another aide, and rushed to telephone the news to Nixon's top White House assistant, Alexander Haig.

A statement of Colson's confession was then read by Assistant Special Prosecutor William Merrill. It said that Colson had admitted having devised "a scheme to obtain derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg," who at the time was facing trial for leaking the Pentagon papers. Colson wanted Ellsberg to "be tried in the newspapers" even though this would have an "adverse effect on his right to a fair trial." Colson's aim was to "neutralize" Ellsberg as a critic of Nixon's Viet Nam policies. Colson also conceded having written a "scurrilous and libelous memorandum" about one of Ellsberg's attorneys.

Colson thus did not admit that he had been part of a conspiracy to burglarize the Los Angeles office of a psychiatrist consulted by Ellsberg, as charged by a federal grand jury. That count against Colson was dropped, as was his indictment as a conspirator in the Watergate cover-up. But Colson's confession undercuts any defense claim that the Los Angeles burglary had a public-spirited purpose; it was plainly part of an attempt to smear Ellsberg. As a result of his guilty plea, Colson faces a possible prison sentence of five years and certain disbarment.

Colson explained in a statement read to reporters that he had "watched with a heavy heart the country I love being torn apart these past months by one of the most divisive and bitter controversies in our history." Clearly refer-

ring to impeachment, he said that "the prompt and just resolution of other proceedings, far more important than my trial, is vital to our democratic process. I want to be free to contribute to that resolution no matter whom it may help or hurt—me or others."

Still, there was skepticism about Colson's motives (*see following story*) and some uncertainty about any testimony he may now give. "I think he'll help the President," said a Colson intimate. "And he'll knock hell out of John Dean."

That may yet happen, but TIME has learned from knowledgeable people close to Colson that as he began telling his story to investigators last week, the initial outlines contradicted Nixon's public Watergate defense. Colson is saying that he talked with Nixon in both January and February of last year about a Watergate cover-up. In January, he says, he told the President: "Something is going on here that is very wrong. There's got to be an investigation." Colson quotes Nixon as replying: "What do you think we ought to do?" Colson's answer: "I'll see what I can find out."

By February, Colson contends, he had learned of John Mitchell's approval of payments to the original Watergate defendants. Colson promptly warned the President that these payoffs were taking place. Nixon's alleged reply: "What do you mean? Mitchell says he is innocent." Colson claims that he then told Chief of Staff Haldeman that Mitchell must step forward and take the blame for the payoffs. According to Colson, Haldeman answered: "If Mitchell goes, he's going to take you with him." Colson said he was not worried about that. He asserts that he also warned Ehrlichman and Dean about the cover-up—and got unconcerned responses.

Colson made similar statements in an interview with the *New York Times* a year ago—but he interpreted the alleged conversations with Nixon as evidence that the President had been unaware of the cover-up.

Nevertheless the Colson account conflicts with Nixon's claim that he first learned about the cash payoffs and cover-up from Dean on March 21. As Colson tells it, Nixon was warned two months earlier—and took no action. When Nixon finally accepted the resignations of Ehrlichman and Haldeman in April 1973, Colson now says, the President told him: "God bless you—you were right all along." Colson may, however, put his statements about the President in a less damaging light under cross-examination.

Colson is also telling investigators that he and the President discussed clemency for Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt shortly after Hunt's wife Dorothy died in an airplane crash in December 1972. Whether Colson contends that Nixon approved such clemency could not be learned. Nixon has denied giving any such approval but is quoted in his tape transcripts as admitting to "somebody" that "commutation should be considered on the basis of his [Hunt's] wife's death." There is no practical difference between commutation of sentence and Executive clemency.

III. GESELL STUDIES CONTEMPT

After receiving the sensational Colson plea, the sharp-tongued Judge Gesell turned to the tense situation created

by Ehrlichman's efforts to gain access to his personal White House files for his defense in the Ellsberg burglary case. Gesell had threatened to dismiss the charges against Ehrlichman if any evidence held by the White House was denied him. On Monday, St. Clair had agreed that Ehrlichman, his attorney William Frates and a stenographer could see the files.

But when Ehrlichman and Frates arrived at the White House on Wednesday, Frates was told to remain in his car on the White House grounds. Only Ehrlichman could browse through his files—stacks of yellow legal pads—and he could not take any notes on what he saw. He could only indicate what he wanted; then a junior White House attorney, Geoff Shepard, would mark the passage and show it to Presidential Attorney Fred Buzhardt. Buzhardt would screen this and consult with St. Clair, who presumably would take the matter up with Nixon. The process, according to Frates, produced "only an inch or so" of material. Ehrlichman finally protested and left.

Back in court, St. Clair absorbed his second severe scolding from the judge. "Will you produce Mr. Ehrlichman's notes?" Gesell asked. "I don't produce this material; the President does," replied St. Clair, "and he has not given me the authority to so state."

Shaking his head, Gesell declared that he would hold an immediate hearing on who had custody of the papers "so that I can consider use of the contempt statute." In a strange judicial scene, St. Clair, who earlier had been grinning and sometimes winking at Ehrlichman, was then allowed to question him. "Now those files were made by you on company ... I mean, Government time, is that correct? Is it fair to say that some items on that pad affect the national security? Does your attorney have security clearance?"

Totally Offensive. Impatiently, Gesell interrupted. "When you make a commitment in open court, you make it to me," he said, shaking a finger at St. Clair. "You broke it. I didn't think it was necessary in dealing with you to seek assurances in writing. I will determine what evidence goes to the jury, not Mr. Ehrlichman, not you, not the President." Called to the stand, Buzhardt testified that Ehrlichman's files were in Nixon's sole control and that only the President could authorize access to them.

The judge turned back to St. Clair. "The White House conduct in this case is totally offensive," he declared. "It borders on obstruction." Referring to the barring of Ehrlichman's lawyer from the files, Gesell added: "It's absurd. I don't see how I can tolerate it. I'm astounded, totally astounded. It's totally offensive to our entire concept of justice."

St. Clair protested: "The President has to deal with the Constitution as he sees it, and with all due respect, it's his decision and not yours."

Gesell retorted: "I don't think he understands the consequences of what he's doing. He thinks Mr. Frates' access raises some kind of hazard to the future of the nation. I just can't accept that." The judge then announced that he would soon issue another order. It is expected to give the President one more chance to provide the Ehrlichman files. If he fails to comply, Gesell could hold a hearing this week on whether the President should be cited for contempt of court. Presumably, no attempt would be made to fine or imprison the President for contempt, but such a citation would have an adverse public impact on him and would be weighed as another possible article of impeachment.

IV. THE GRAND JURY'S VOTE

After months of rumor, it was finally confirmed last week: the main Watergate grand jury had cited Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator when it returned criminal indictments against seven former Nixon men on March 1. The vote to name Nixon was 19 to 0.

Normally, prosecutors use the somewhat distasteful tactic of naming an individual as a co-conspirator without actually charging him with a crime when they do not have enough evidence to support an indictment or wish to use his testimony in their case against others. In this instance, however, Jaworski's belief that a President could not constitutionally be indicted but had to be impeached by Congress was the reason that Nixon was listed as only a co-conspirator. As a practical matter, the jury's decision may buttress Jaworski's Supreme Court suit to secure Nixon tapes for the conspiracy trial since their relevance is further established.

Conceding that Nixon had been cited, St. Clair quite properly pointed out that "grand jury allegations are far from proof." When all the evidence is in, St. Clair argued, Nixon's innocence will be proved. However, all the evidence may never be acquired by the lawful authorities because the President is spurning subpoenas from both Jaworski and the House Judiciary Committee.

Ironically, the fact that Nixon was named by the grand jury as a co-conspirator may work indirectly to keep him in office longer because it presents a solid obstacle to his resignation. If he were to step down after impeachment by the House but before a Senate trial, for example, he would have to make some deal with Jaworski to avoid an outright indictment in the cover-up case or at the least face unchallengeable orders to appear as a star witness in the trial.

But Nixon is not expected to take his own advice in the matter. According to the released White House tape transcripts, Nixon asked Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen on April 17, 1973, what it means to be cited as an unindicted co-conspirator. Told by Petersen that this amounts to a serious allegation of complicity, Nixon declared: "Anybody that was an unindicted co-conspirator would then be immediately put on leave."

GENERAL

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 8, 1974

**No voice in space**

The Americans now possess the supreme persuader in the form of a satellite that will beam their television programmes anywhere in the world. What does Britain have? Nothing

By christening their latest satellite in gobbledygook—what a section of the aircraft industry knows as yukspeak—and by saying nothing at all about it since last week's successful launch, the Americans have managed to keep attention off the satellite's real purpose for the time being. The Applications Technology Satellite carries the usual weird array of scientific appendages but its object is quite simply propaganda. The Americans say that, after trials lasting anything up to a year, the satellite will start beaming educational television programmes to India and Latin America. What's new in that? Only that this is the first satellite with sufficient power built into it to be able to do without huge ground aerials costing around £1m a time. Since only governments have that sort of money, they can censor information transmitted by satellite and only pipe into the public television service those programmes considered suitable for public consumption. Once, however, the satellite can transmit a strong enough signal to be received on a small aerial, or picked up directly on the telly without any special aerial at all, the power to censor is broken even more effectively than it has been by the transistor radio.

This is what the Americans are on the way to doing. ATS is experimental and much has gone wrong. It is a year late and cost twice as much as expected: \$110m instead of \$55m. But if it works the Americans are on the way to commanding the eyes of the uncommitted, undeveloped world. The Russians are alive to the risk and protested immediately ATS was launched, asking for United Nations regulation of these dangerous toys and a ban on transmitting programmes to foreign countries without their governments' permission. Europe pretended that nothing had happened.

This was not so in the 1960s. A real attempt was made by the major European countries to club together to build themselves a rocket large enough to launch comparable propaganda satellites. The satellites are not easy to build, as American experience shows. The first communication satellites had a transmitting power of only 40 watts; ATS has a signal strength of 200 kilowatts and has the Apollo moon programme largely to thank for that. It still needs special glassfibre receivers on the ground to pick up the signal and feed it into a television set, but these are described as relatively cheap, about \$600 each, certainly cheap enough for India to plan to install them in 5,000 villages.

If Europe wanted to develop comparable equipment it

could. What it could not do and will not be able to do in the foreseeable future is launch the satellite once it is built. The rocket launcher once planned around Britain's Blue Streak rocket (itself a development of the American Thor rocket) is now only a painful memory. Europe relies for its satellite communications on the international company that, in theory, controls America's Comsat and for its scientific rockets on the Americans' kindness in launching them—not always successfully.

The Americans can hardly be asked to launch Europe's propaganda for it, competing directly with what might as well be called Eyes of America since it will replace most radio broadcasts. One of the motives that sustained the Europa rocket project long after all other justification had failed was the feeling that in the interests of free speech and expression Europe's own voice should have a hearing alongside that of America and Russia. The rocket eventually died because it could not be made to work. Each of the major partners, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries—in ascending order going up the rocket and descending order of contributions to cost—worked on their own sections separately and the parts would not gel when they were assembled. Europa was never once successfully launched.

This has put the EEC off rockets and big space projects for good, although it was not European technology that lay behind Europa's failure so much as the crazy system of divided responsibility for each part of the rocket. Since Europa's collapse, France has been the only European country to continue work on fairly big rockets, military as well as scientific. But the rocket needed to launch a propaganda satellite has to be bigger than any of these: it needs to compare in class with an intercontinental ballistic missile and then have something in hand.

Is a new and better Europa scheme worth reviving? The ATS satellite may not look much of a menace now, but before a decade is out the earth is liable to be girdled with its offspring, each able to transmit programmes directly into people's homes. A decade from now, television will not be a backwoods rarity any longer; jungle villages in Mexico have their television now although they do not necessarily have shoes. To say that Britain should not be up there claiming their attention is equivalent to saying that after two millennia of Christian and a few more of pre-Christian culture, Europe has nothing to contribute. It would be a more rewarding venture than some of the follies European countries waste their resources on now.

WASHINGTON POST
31 May 1974

Radios Request \$50 Million

Reuter

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday for almost \$50 million in operating funds for the year beginning July 1.

David M. Abshire, chairman

of the board for International Broadcasting, established by Congress last year, requested \$30,685,000 for Radio Free Europe and \$18,865,000 for Radio Liberty. Another \$290,000 would go for the board's own activities, he said.

The stations beam broadcast in a variety of languages to the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 June 1974

William F. Buckley Jr.: Caution: Soviets Ahead

What is there to look out for in President Nixon's two trips?

As regards the Mideast, we need to watch out for that comprehensive enthusiasm with which Nixon greets pleasant developments. One would have thought that the landing on the moon ended problems on earth; ditto the Vietnam cease-fire, ditto the China trip.

Concerning the Mideast, we have to fear any arrangement the stability of which depends on the presumptive continuing cooperation of the Soviet Union. And such a dependency would transpire not from any development in the Mideast related to Nixon's trip, but from the naval budget in Congress. If we lose our power in the Mediterranean, we will be banking in the future on Soviet good will; and that is not worth two cents on the dollar, as Nixon has from time to time reminded us in the past.

Viewed in purely strategic terms, our relations with Israel are extremely important, giving us a foot in the door of an area (the Persian Gulf) which, until we discover a substitute for oil, is the most critical

in the world. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union, having labored so exhaustively for 50 years for hegemony, will — now that nature has revealed the ultimate strategic weapon, sitting there in her back yard, tended to by a few olive-skinned sheiks — will suddenly discover the virtues of self-abnegation.

As regards the trip to the Soviet Union, we have to watch out for efforts by Nixon to get around the Jackson Amendment. The second Jackson Amendment. The First Jackson Amendment is the more notorious, demanding that the Soviet Union give emigration rights to Jewish citizens before we grant to the Soviet Union the economic advantages of most favored nation.

The second Jackson Amendment demands nuclear parity in the next round of the Strategic Arms Limitations talks. This has been a vexing point for Nixon's disarmament specialists. The approach under Ambassador Smith at SALT I was that we didn't really need nuclear parity, let alone nuclear superiority; that

all we needed was the knowledge that we could visit intolerable damage on the Soviet Union. Mutual Assured Destruction, they called it, and suddenly the roof caved in on the whole thing when we were required to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union could successfully eliminate our land-based missiles while reserving enough weapons to devastate our cities in the event that we ordered our submarines to devastate theirs.

Their strategic arguments now turn on whether we should develop weapons that would train on the Soviets' weapons (a counterforce); or whether we should re-inter our land-based missiles so as — if feasible — to make them proof against even the highly-accurate megaton weapons of the Soviet Union.

Once again, the thing to watch out for is any sign that we are substituting optimism for rigor; that we have got into the habit of assuming that Soviet policy is conducted according to rational lines of thought. A country that will

starve its people rather than free agriculture has not yet abandoned ideology.

It is said that nothing of a permanent nature will be attempted for so long as Nixon is under the cloud of Watergate. Careful, now. Because for so long as he is under that cloud, America's concerns tend to be introspective. It is almost impossible to attract the attention of an audience outside New York City to such questions as whether we have enough firepower in the eastern Mediterranean. They want, instead, to hear about Rosemary's tapes, or Colson's rediscovery of his sacred grandmother.

And the line of least resistance for Nixon is to attempt, by circular argument, to confirm his faith in a "generation of peace." By declaring that he has achieved a generation of peace. Rather like the solution advanced to the Vietnam war a half dozen years ago: declare that we have won it — and pull out, and maybe nobody will notice what really happened. What really would happen to us would come after Nixon is gone; but not, in that event, after Nixon is forgotten.

WASHINGTON POST Saturday, June 8, 1974

John Herling

Lovestone's Departure

The retirement of Jay Lovestone, the grey eminence of AFL-CIO's foreign relations, marks the end of an era for the U.S. labor movement. It will not go unnoticed in the world intelligence community.

Except for George Meany, whose intimate adviser he was for years in the field of foreign policy, Mr. Lovestone has done more than any individual in the AFL-CIO to shape official labor attitudes in the international field.

Just how Lovestone operated at one stage on the international field has been described by columnist Thomas W. Braden, once a top-flight assistant to Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. With funds provided by the CIA, Lovestone and his assistant, Irving Brown, were able to beef up their support of Europe's non-Communist trade unions in the 1930's. They were thus able to resist the aggressive and highly successful Soviet-subsidized unions in France and Italy. But, wrote Mr. Braden some time ago, "though Lovestone wanted our money, he didn't want to tell us precisely how he spent it. We knew he was laying out nearly two million dollars a year. In his view, what more did we want to know?" When Braden appealed to an unidentified top, responsible labor leader, he was told, "Lovestone and his bunch do a good job."

Mr. Herling writes frequently on labor topics for these pages.

Now past 75, Lovestone began his political career as an activist in the Communist movement in the United States. After a few years, he maneuvered his way into the leadership of the American Communist Party. In 1929 he broke with the official Communist Party. He had been evicted from his U.S. office by the Communist International. For about a decade after that he led the Communist Party (Opposition), also known as the CPO.

With this leverage, he hoped to recapture his once-eminent position in the Communist movement. He sought unsuccessfully to develop a trade union following to provide political muscle. At one time, he planned to play a significant role in the then newly created United Auto Workers in the late 1930's, setting his cap for groups which included the brothers, Walter, Roy and Victor Reuther. He failed dismally in this attempt at political seduction. He never forgave Reuther for giving him the back of his hand. Lovestone became Walter Reuther's implacable enemy, hinting darkly that he was in cahoots with the Communists and fellow-travelers.

the embittered Lovestone for a while wandered unattached. Through the intercession of a political ally in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, he was given a desk by David Dubinsky, president of the ILGWU, to keep track of events on the international field.

But, no file clerk was he. Mr. Lovestone soon became a source of ready information on personalities and shenanigans in the Communist world. He gradually won the confidence of Matthew Woll, then the chairman of the AFL International Affairs Committee, and not long after, that of George Meany, who was then on his way to the presidency of the American Federation of Labor.

A little later, a considerable section of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as well as the AFL unions, came together with the British and German trade unions to establish the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Not long after the creation of the ICFTU, Lovestone began to build his influence in the AFL by issuing warnings of impending disaster against ICFTU leadership and many of the Socialist-oriented trade unionists in Europe. A former Communist, Mr. Lovestone retained his hostility against the Socialists and leap-frogged in Europe as well as in the U.S. over to the more conservative groups. He was decorated by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He soon became known as a mouthpiece in in-

ternal struggles in the meantime, Lovestone had become the right-wing guru for trade union leaders. He wrote their speeches, fed them ideas, and developed a respectful constituency.

But now, Lovestone's career as the court intellectual for the AFL-CIO is officially over. He leaves behind him his old colleague, Irving Brown, stationed by the AFL-CIO in Europe, who from time to time has proved himself more adjustable to changing realities than his one-time mentor.

Lovestone's place as director of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department will now be assumed by Ernest

S. Lee, now assistant director. Lee is a former major in the Marines, decorated for bravery in Korea. He has developed a consuming interest in international labor matters, encouraged by his wife, the former Eileen Meany, and his father-in-law. Lee is also a graduate of Georgetown School of Foreign Service. His background, vastly different from Lovestone's, leaves him without ideological hang-ups. His is unhampered by the psychological subtleties of an intricate past, and unburdened by excessive response to the problems besetting foreign labor movements. He is an amiable "fortress-America" man.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 17, 1974

A WAY TO HALT INFLATION

The Treasury Secretary's Blueprint

Slash massive federal outlays if you're going to whip "double-digit inflation," says William E. Simon, who came to the magazine's conference room for this interview. Will Congress agree? Yes, he predicts, and tells why.

Q Mr. Secretary, is this country going to be able to bring inflation under control?

A We can do it. But it is going to require a curb on Government spending, and the key to that is better co-operation between the Congress and the White House. It also requires a will on the part of the American people to stop demanding or accepting the largesse of the Federal Government without paying for it. It's just as fundamental as that. We must work toward balance in fiscal and monetary policy in this Government.

I won't buy for one minute the idea that 75 per cent of the budget is uncontrollable. That is a cop-out. We've got to quit saying there's nothing we can do about it—that "Congress has passed the laws, and here they are, even if we don't like some of them."

I'm suggesting that we—both the Congress and the executive branch—had better take a brand-new look at this and begin to get some fiscal sanity back into the picture.

Q Can you cite some examples of what you consider bloated federal spending?

A I'm not going to be specific on recommendations right now because we're doing a budget study on the controllable side—as well as on the uncontrollable side, which is our big problem.

Q Just what do you mean by "controllable" and "uncontrollable" items in the budget?

A Essentially, "uncontrollable" refers to budget items provided for by laws passed in previous years. In other words, laws already on the books spell out some obligations for more than one fiscal year. For instance, Social Security payments are spelled out by law. As the number of persons receiving Social Security increases, the amount of money goes up, too, in almost uncontrollable fashion.

Q Who is to blame for the expansion of the uncontrollable side of the budget?

A You can't just point the finger at Congress—or at the White House. It has come from both sides. Anyway, what's the difference whether it was an Administration plan or a congressional action that locked in new spending on an ever-escalating basis? The fact of the matter is that it's there.

Congress is about to pass—I hope—a budget-reform bill which is a step in the right direction, but only a first step. Congressmen are now hearing from their constituents that something has to be done about the budget and about inflation. That's why we're seeing action. I met with the Republican side of the House Ways and Means Committee just

William E. Simon, 46, is a self-made millionaire who came to Washington in 1973 from a career in investment banking to take the No. 2 job in the Treasury Department. He was named energy czar during the Arab embargo, rode through that crisis with high marks. On May 8, he became Secretary of the Treasury—and a key man in the battle against inflation.

the other day, and to a man they are hearing this from back home. It's a genuine ground swell.

Q Do you mean that people are urging a cut in Government spending to deal with inflation?

A Yes, sir—and these Congressmen say that this will be the most popular thing that they can do to get re-elected this year. They tell me that their people are simply fed up with the way the Government's budget shoots up year after year. It took this country 185 years to get to 100 billion dollars of annual spending in the budget. But it took only nine more years to get to 200 billion, and only four more after that to get to the third hundred billion.

Q In the past when people talked about cutting federal spending they were for it as long as it didn't affect them—

A Yes, in the past that's been correct. But in the past we've never had double-digit inflation. It's always been well under 10 per cent. But now that we're above that into two digits, people are scared. And if we wait another year or two to meet this head on, we'll be back in the same mess we are right now, only at a higher rate of inflation, because it's going to start from a higher base than the one we started at two years ago, which was 3 per cent.

It's the same with interest rates. Interest rates this time started up from 8 or 8½ per cent. During the credit crunch in '66, they started at 6 per cent.

Each year we're grinding more and more inflationary expectation and actual inflation into our economy, and if we don't begin to turn it around, not only on the fiscal side—but on the spending side—but on the financing side of it, this country is headed for disaster.

The financing side is little understood. But it is staggering when you realize that borrowing by the Federal Government and its agencies today takes about 60 per cent of the funds raised in the securities markets.

Q Do you believe that in an election year Congressmen are going to vote to cut Government spending?

A I certainly do. For the first time we have a chance of doing something because of the double-digit inflation. If we ever had a chance to cut back, now is the time. I'm not saying we can balance the fiscal '75 budget [for the year starting July 1, 1974]. I don't think it's advisable to slam on the fiscal brakes that quickly. But we must make a step in that direction and then move toward balance in '76.

Q How much of a budget cut would be a step in the right direction? Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, has said you couldn't find as much as 5 billions—

A It all depends whether one wants to take a look at the uncontrollables. You probably couldn't find 5 or 6 billions if you just wanted to look at the controllable portion of it. I'm talking about the uncontrollable side.

You're going to say, "Well, how do you get that done?" The answer is that you identify programs that are overfunded—whether it's food stamps or the many programs of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare—or wherever it is that the budget has grown tremendously.

Q Don't you have to go to Congress, though, and get a change in the law?

A That's right—you do.

Q Isn't it a fact that every time the President has done that—on school lunches, milk programs, almost anything—he's been beaten down?

A That's been true. But I'm not going to take the attitude: "Ah, hell, we've tried that before; it doesn't work." I suggest that it's never really been tried before with everybody's heart behind it.

Q Are you suggesting a fundamental change in attitude toward things like the full-employment budget?

A I am not a full-employment-budget man. I don't think 1 per cent of the people in this country understand the full-employment concept. It's a good concept, useful to those who fully understand it, but there are problems with how it is interpreted and how it is calculated.

For example, almost everybody agrees that a goal of no more than 4 per cent unemployment is unreasonable in view of the change in the labor force over the last 20 years. But what I am talking about is actually heading toward balance in the unified budget as we know it.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the Administration's ability to deal with this in Congress been damaged by the Watergate mess?

A I can honestly say—and I don't know anybody in this Administration who spends more time on the Hill and on the telephone talking to Congressmen than I do—that it hasn't bothered me one iota.

Q You don't think the authority of the President has been eroded with Congress?

A I certainly do not.

I'm suggesting that things have changed, and events are going to make Congress want to go in the budget-cutting direction because at this point in time it's the right thing to do politically. They're getting the ground swell from home. Double-digit inflation is a tax that's being levied on the American people, and they don't like it.

Let me tell you something: I think there's such a change in sentiment that we should put what you might call a "full-court press" on this whole subject and really fight to cooperate and get together. And I've talked to Democrats and Republicans alike on the Hill, and that is the attitude I find.

Q Historically, hasn't inflation of the sort we have now been solved only by the country going into a recession?

A I don't know that we can go back and say that every single time it's gone that way. I agree that the danger is there when you're relying solely on monetary policy to control inflation. But if we use fiscal policy to restrain federal spending and give monetary policy a chance to work, which Arthur Burns [Chairman, Federal Reserve Board] would certainly like to do, then we can lick this problem.

I'm a realist. I don't know that over the long run this great country will do all these things, but I'm only here once, and so shouldn't I try to get done what's right?

Q Mr. Simon, how much is this out of your control in the sense that inflation is being imported through high prices for oil and other basic commodities?

A Our energy policy will correct the oil problem over time. Until that time, obviously, we're going to be paying these high prices for foreign oil. But they're not going to triple again—we certainly know that. If anything, they're going to be lower a year from now, or even sooner, than they are right now. I'd bet on it, if I were a betting man.

Now, we haven't had a complete pass-through, yet, of this big run-up in oil prices. We won't see that until the end of the year. For example, in petrochemicals we have yet to see the full impact. And there isn't much that you touch during the course of the day that isn't made in one form or another in the petrochemical industry. The high cost of oil is going to come out in the form of higher prices for toothbrushes, plastic cups, and so on down the line.

they leap upward and add to inflation?

A My judgment is that while wage increases aren't going to be in the 15 to 20 per cent bracket, they are going to be significantly above the 5.5 per cent guideline that we had in effect the past couple of years.

Q Does that mean you need a new incomes policy?

A No, it most certainly does not, because if we learned anything from wage and price controls it is that they produce distortions and compound and postpone your problems.

What we must have is restraint on federal spending so that the Government won't be putting all this pressure on the economy and the money markets, forcing interest rates higher than they should be and keeping the inflation fires burning. This is what has to be reversed. This is fundamental. Then you can deal with shortages and other inflationary problems by acting rather than reacting.

Q Are you worried that present interest rates—as high as 12 per cent or more—will restrain business borrowing enough to prevent recovery from the current slump?

A There's a lot of talk about the slump, but actually it is isolated to energy-related activities. Automobiles are the prime case in point.

It's true that high interest rates are postponing borrowing. There's no question about that. But I'm not worried about too little capital investment. The McGraw-Hill survey shows an increase of 19 per cent in outlays for plant and equipment this year. The Commerce Department figure is 12.2 per cent. But whether it's 12.2 per cent or 19 per cent, the evidence is compelling that this is a source of great strength in our business outlook right through 1975.

Another point that we must stress as far as this inflation problem is concerned is that we have to give incentives to business to expand production of fuel, paper, steel and other commodities so that the U. S. doesn't have to rely on foreign nations for these key items.

Q Do you have a plan that would do this?

A One thing we're talking about is accelerated depreciation. It works, and it works quickly. This was proven back in the Korean War. In the Treasury Department, we are taking a look at the various plans to expand production of these vital products. We're discussing whether it should be done on an over-all basis or whether it should be done by specific industries.

Q What is your position on an income-tax cut for individuals?

A It would be highly inflationary.

All it would do is fuel a demand that's already excessive. People would just go out and buy the small-ticket items that are already in short supply.

Q Do you think Congress will vote against a tax cut for individuals, but approve reductions for business?

A We're not talking about cutting taxes for business. We're talking about accelerated depreciation and other incentives for some of our basic industries to assure the consumer that he can get commodities at a reasonable price, rather than forcing him to rely on foreign sources at a much higher price.

Don't misunderstand me. I'm not saying it will be easy to get this through Congress. But we're hopeful, and we're talking with the leaders on the Hill. We're going into this study with the encouragement of Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, and Speaker Carl Albert in the House. Senator Hugh Scott and Representative John Rhodes, the Republican leaders in Congress, are taking part in these discussions.

Q Mr. Simon, economists seem to be in disarray. Many are confessing they're baffled by this double-digit inflation—that many of the old rules don't seem to apply. How can anybody speak with much confidence of what the cure is?

A I'm sorry, but I don't buy the first part of your comment—that those in the economic profession are in such disarray that they can't find agreement. The economists whose opinions I respect, whether it's Paul McCracken [a former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers] or many others, are in fundamental agreement that, leaving the politics of the situation aside, for a sustained period of time there is one fundamental thing that's needed, and that's prudent fiscal and monetary policies.

Let me tell you something to make my point: Go back and trace America's prosperity. At the end of World War II it was the only country in the world with any real power, of the world re-

covered its economic strength, however, the dollar became overvalued. We should have changed that somewhere around the mid-50s or late '50s, but we continued with a fixed exchange rate and an overvalued dollar. And as we were creating all of those deficits and sending the IOU's around the world, you could find a lot of economists who were predicting—some almost to the year—that a fundamental change would have to be made in our international monetary system. And they were correct; some economists, at least, understood what was going on. A lot of them talked about it, but it wasn't very popular to print what they said.

I can give you a score of statements I made before I came to Washington. I haven't changed my tune one iota.

Q Some well-known economists are saying that the 1975 federal budget, which you say must be cut, is too tight—

A Sure. There's a group who believe that the American people have grown to expect each year that all of their needs are going to be met by Washington, and "let's just ignore the inflationary consequences."

It isn't going to be easy to turn this thing around. But, at this particular point in time, I believe sincerely we have an opportunity to do it, due to the unprecedented inflation rate and interest rates. Now that we've got people's attention, damn it, let's do what's right.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 June 1974

Heroin Traffic Into U.S. Is Reported Up

WASHINGTON, June 10 (AP)

—After two years of decline, heroin traffic into the United States is reported on the upswing, with Mexico replacing Europe as the primary source and conduit for the narcotic.

Federal drug enforcement officials say the heroin is being refined from poppy plants grown in western Mexico, then shipped across the border. At the same time, there is growing trade in marijuana from long-established sources in Mexico, leading to an intensified anti-smuggling campaign along the 1,400-mile border.

Some officials say that efforts by the United States Government to cope with the illicit activity have been impeded to some extent by bureaucratic wrangling among agencies with jurisdiction over

certain aspects of narcotics control.

The Customs Service, which has been concentrating its own border drug interdiction efforts chiefly against the Mexican marijuana trade, contends that heroin traffic from Mexico is negligible. Although heroin remains priority No. 1 because of the danger it poses, customs officials say that synthetic drugs are their biggest worry at the moment.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, a year-old Justice Department agency with which Customs has frequently clashed over enforcement policy, says that Mexico has become the source of as much as 50 per cent of the heroin reaching the United States.

This is a dramatic change from the peak years of heroin traffic, 1969-72, when up to 80

per cent of the heroin reaching United States shores came from or through Europe and only about 15 per cent from Mexico.

Mexican heroin is easily identified by its brown color, as opposed to the more refined white product from European laboratories. But officials say there is no difference in the potency.

East Coast Sightings

John R. Bartels Jr., director of the drug agency, said in an interview that the brown heroin, once confined almost entirely to the West Coast, had been turning up recently in eastern cities as well. He said this was one indicator used by his agency to determine the source of the drug, and "the fact that they're not getting very much heroin along the

border doesn't mean it isn't coming in."

Mr. Bartels says he is skeptical of most drug statistics reported by government agencies and concedes he is "not happy" even with the figures compiled by his own.

Partly responsible for the shift to Mexico as a major heroin source, has been the success of Federal authorities in breaking up established connections that brought it in from Europe, the Middle East and Asia, officials say.

Mr. Bartels says that while the international heroin traffic always has been controlled by the Mafia, the Mexican connection has been until recently a less organized system. But there are signs that "these guys are now starting to get organized," he said.

Eastern Europe

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 8, 1974



The company he chooses

A travelling man getting ready to see his old friend Mr Brezhnev again should draw some useful lessons about detente from taking a serious look at Mr Brezhnev's Russia

When President Nixon flies off to Russia on June 27th he might ask himself not what Mr Brezhnev can do for him but what he is doing for Mr Brezhnev. Like Mr Nixon, Mr Brezhnev has his eyes fixed on 1976. That is the year he too has to get through to, the year when he will have to justify his 12 years of power over the Soviet Union to the next congress of his communist party; and the relationship Mr Brezhnev believes he has built up with Mr Nixon's America will be one of the main arguments he will want to point to. That relationship, which the western world has carelessly and inaccurately allowed the Russians to call detente, is now in need of reappraisal. It is by no means evident that it serves any western interest to continue down the path of detente as Mr Brezhnev defines it; and it is even less evident that the United States or western Europe has its own better definition. The whole question of detente with Russia has become inseparable from the sort of place Mr Brezhnev's Russia is.

If the Soviet communist party can make its assessment of what Mr Brezhnev has done for Russia, other people outside the Soviet Union are entitled to their judgment too. The judgment is likely to be that late-Brezhnev Russia is a better place than Stalin's Russia was, but a worse one in most respects than the Russia of Khrushchev's last years before Khrushchev was overthrown in 1964. Mr Brezhnev has failed to carry forward the opening-up of Soviet life that Khrushchev seemed to be starting, and in the most important matter of all he has reversed it.

It is true that most people in the Soviet Union, like most people elsewhere, are materially more comfortable than they were a dozen years ago. The economy has kept up a reasonable growth rate, although that growth is neither as good as Soviet statistics make it sound nor as good as it could have been under a better system of management; and the long years in which everything was ploughed back into investment have at last been followed by permission for people to indulge in a bit more consumption. It is also true that the Russians have benefited in a small way from the liberating effect of electronics: now that journalists abroad have discovered that it is fairly easy to ring up Moscow, it has become that much harder for Mr Brezhnev's police to keep his political opponents entirely silent. But that is about the extent of what has changed for the better in the past few years.

The scope for expressing dissent inside Russia itself, having broadened a little in the middle 1960s, has now narrowed again. The extra powers given this week to the militia which backs up the Soviet police force are the latest example of Mr Brezhnev's way of running his country. The hope that there was going to be some decentralisation of the economy—the Liberman experiment, another shooting-star of the mid-1960s—has also vanished into the darkness, and the central planners and their computers are back in charge again: the gradual slowing down of the growth rate and the appalling incompetence of the Soviet distribution system are among the consequences of that. The modest freedom that Khrushchev allowed to intellectuals and artists has been repealed; the monopoly apparatus of state-supervised writers' and artists' unions has reimposed its discipline.

Remember Rome

These are all the results of the basic decision Mr Brezhnev seems to have reached two or three years after he came to power, which was to take no risks with the communist party's control over virtually everything that happens in Russia, or with the control which he and a handful of colleagues on the politburo exercise over the party. This concentration of power is the disastrous weakness of the system of government that Lenin bequeathed to communism. It means that a communist country, even more than most other dictatorships, takes the stamp of the men at its top. When they are relatively civilised, it is too; when they are not, it cannot be. Until this concentration of power is broken up, the Soviet empire will be like the Roman empire: a world unto itself, a huge area of many diverse peoples insulated from contact with the outside and ultimately dependent on the personal will of the man who has plotted or bullied his way to the top. In Stalin, it has had its Tiberius; in Khrushchev, perhaps, its crude but relatively decent Claudius. Mr Brezhnev had his chance, when he took over from Khrushchev, to break out of the pattern this concentration of power imposes. It is now clear that he has decided not to; and it becomes almost a toss of the coin whether the succession brings a Nero or a Marcus Aurelius.

It is unlikely that Mr Brezhnev reads much Roman history; but this is the central fact about his Russia, and it is with his Russia that the west has to decide what detente means. When Mr Nixon arrives in Moscow for the third in the series of superpower leaders' meetings—Nixon to Russia in 1972, Brezhnev to America in 1973, Nixon back again this year—he will be up against the fact that there is not very much of substance the two men can hope to agree about. They may produce the outlines of a treaty to limit underground nuclear testing, although the Russians will obviously not accept anything strict enough to stop them testing the multiple warheads they want to fit into their missiles. There may be some more exchanges of science and culture, the usual fol-de-rol of these occasions. But apart from that the agenda of detente has run up against the stops.

Mr Brezhnev is not going to get the sort of help for developing his economy he was originally hoping for, because Senator Jackson has got America's purse strings tied up in knots and Germany's Herr Schmidt does not believe in cheap credits for Russia. He is most unlikely to get the grand summit finale he wants to end the European security conference with. The negotiations about limiting Russia's and America's missile armouries, and about cutting the armies in Europe, have got nowhere yet. Of course, Mr Brezhnev has already snapped up the offerings that Herr Brandt's Ostpolitik gave to him—the recognition of East Germany and the agreement that the frontiers of Europe are "untouchable"—and made very few concessions of his own in return. But his success in the Ostpolitik has itself made the governments of the west more suspicious of what he is after.

Disarming only the gullible

Maybe this suggests what the limits of detente should be. There is a good argument for negotiations that try to strike

a balance between the armed forces of the Soviet and western alliances. There are good reasons for setting up a mechanism by which the governments in Washington and Moscow can try to keep crises under control, and for building up a body of crisis-management case-law that the successors of Nixon and Brezhnev can draw upon. But it is not at all evident that a western world already in bad trouble with its balance of payments because of what the oil-producers have done to it should find it desirable to provide very large amounts of easy money for the improvement of the Soviet economy. Nor is it apparent where the advantage lies for the west in the sort of negotiations that produce nothing more than rotund declarations which encourage the intellectual disarmament of the gullible.

The usual objection is that if Mr Brezhnev does not get more or less what he wants he is liable to be replaced as the Soviet Union's leader by someone even harder to get on with. But the more one looks at that argument the less convincing it seems. The Russians have been obliged to re-examine their relationship with the west for two very powerful reasons. They cannot make their centrally-controlled economy work as efficiently as they expected; and they have been landed with a cold war with China.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 June 1974

On Solzhenitsyns in Reverse

By Hans Koning

REDDING, Conn.—The story of civil rights abuses in the Soviet Union, with Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn and other dissenters the lone voices of the Russian people, fills our newspaper columns and television screens.

Dangerous as it must be to say in this emotional atmosphere, Mr. Solzhenitsyn, politically speaking, is an ingenuous Pan-Slav, a kind of hawk on the Vietnam war, and the man who wrote that life in Russia "will never again be as sweet as in the summer of 1914." It is sadly necessary to add in haste that this does not imply that he is not as great a writer as many judge him to be—that is, a different subject—nor, assuredly, that this made it right to jail him or force him into exile. But it raises other points.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn does not speak for "the Russian people." He may speak for a small, or large, number of the Russian élite, and it indicates a certain failure in the Soviet brand of socialism if there is a large number of that élite in opposition. But their very existence does not prove that the whole system has failed.

The sympathy in the United States for the dissenters is élitist, too. When such divergent people as Senator Henry M. Jackson and the novelist Herbert Gold proclaim that the right to emigrate is the basic human right, they show awareness of only a very little sliver indeed of humanity.

The dispossessed of this world are not pining to emigrate—their governments would give them a happy good riddance, and no one would receive them—but rather, they want the right to eat, to have a school for their children and a doctor when they are sick. These are the basic rights, and they are withheld from many, in the United States as in the rest of the world.

Our indignations are élitist indignations: We, Western liberals, have been reared on our mothers' milk with the private tragedy of private fates; all our arts and letters are about it; we have for centuries cried over Young Werthers and Madame Butterflies, and we have yawned over the starving Bengalis.

Soviet society is at least in its rough outline a society run for the commonweal. To conclude from its treatment of dissenters that it would be immoral for the United States to deal with such a society, while nearly all our allies are dictatorships or autocracies run for tiny groups, is fantastic. So is the entire parallel issue of morality versus pragmatism.

American foreign policy, like all foreign policies, has always been pragmatic.

Let me propose a few theses:

- Let us not accept Senator Jackson's, or anyone else's, indignation unless they have a record of equal or stronger indignation over outrages perpetrated by the United States at home or abroad.

- The United States, while not taking care of its people in the way socialist and semisocialist countries profess to try, does leave them alone—that is, free. In the United States, that is the main gift of our Government—as compared with jobs, health, education elsewhere. Thus, we are rightly anxious that they do not take that away from us and leave us with the worst of all possible worlds. But for a writer or artist to be left alone is not necessarily the greatest good. It is all Mr. Solzhenitsyn wanted; it is not all Vincent van Gogh wanted. Belonging may be as important to some people as freedom is to others. The first category may be weak, the second strong, but then the weak may be a majority on this earth.

- When someone in our part of the

No new government in Moscow can wish away both those things, and any attempt to ignore either of them is going to make the other worse. If Russia tries to go back to a policy of open hostility towards both China and the west it will have to expand its armed forces, which will increase the strain on its economy and make it harder to keep its population even tolerably contented. If it abandons the hope of any economic assistance from the west it may not even be able to maintain its defences against China without cutting its people's standard of living.

The Soviet government, any Soviet government, is caught between these two problems. That is why it needs better relations with the west more than the west does with it; Russia is the one doing the asking. Herr Brandt never understood that, and Mr Nixon may be in danger of forgetting. The odds are that, whoever is in power in Moscow, he will want a truce on his western front and whatever economic help he can get from the west, even if that turns out to be of fairly modest proportions. The west's negotiators, starting from that, should be able to make detente into something better than it has been so far. It is a thought Mr Nixon should pack in his briefcase for Moscow.

world goes as much against the grain as Mr. Solzhenitsyn did in the Soviet Union, he is not imprisoned or exiled, but his work is not published or sold either. The market place here has as effective a veto as any Glorious State Publishing House. The conspiracy of silence, as Pascal called it, takes care of our Solzhenitsyns.

It is obviously not a conspiracy of men and women, but of cultural climate. No one is blacklisted here any more, or so I hope. It isn't necessary to do that. We are so ensconced in a basic liberal-middle class point of view that a real outsider cannot but fail to reach us.

The West must have any number of disenchanting, silenced Solzhenitsyns in reverse. I don't mean iconoclasts out to shock us, for our society doesn't mind that, but rather those who are hopelessly on another wavelength, who do not "speak our language."

Think of those few sad nondialogues between a determinedly fair-minded television interviewer and a survivor from the nineteen-sixties "Movement" (unless the Movement person has caved in under the deadly oppression of silence and gone into regular politics or become a faddist, in which case the show will be nice).

We do not stop to consider that a writer can be disinterested only within the bounds of his own class, race, nation. The liberal—and our arts and letters are liberal—thinks that it is enough to be honest to be disinterested and that he alone in a schismatic world gives every idea a fair hearing. He is not really aware that his point of view is not universal and God-given but just as political and peculiar as any other.

We may enjoy a post-Watergate morality; we surely do not show any post-Vietnam humility.

Hans Koning, a novelist, is author of "Death of a Schoolboy."

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST
13 June 1974

Hobart Rowen

European Bankers on U.S. Leadership

Some of his best friends, President Nixon will be glad to know, are European businessmen and bankers. At last week's session of the International Monetary Conference at Williamsburg, Va., a number of prominent bankers, in separate conversations with this reporter, said they were convinced that the press had needlessly conducted a vendetta against the President.

"Look at what Nixon has been able to do," suggested one international banker. "You have peace instead of riots in your cities, your economy is more stable than elsewhere, and on the international side, he brought about detente with Russia and China."

It was short-sighted of the press, according to another, to attack such a successful president merely because of his unethical behavior. "Why should the press assume the responsibility of the church?" he asked.

I have heard these arguments before in Europe, where neither the role of the American press nor the depth of the Watergate scandals is totally appreciated.

But what seemed to me significant, in talking this time to European bankers, is that despite their belief that President Nixon has been dealt with unfairly by the American press, they recognize that restoration of American leadership in the world may now depend on his removal from office.

Or, to put it another way, Europeans may doubt that the press and (as they see it) the televised Watergate committee sessions were well advised. But now they take impeachment as a probability and even a necessity.

There is, in addition, a great uneasiness

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 June 1974

Kissinger in trouble with Europe

His Mideast diplomacy leaves allies out

By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
A new chasm of misunderstanding is opening between Europe and the United States, stemming from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's

"European bankers now take impeachment as a probability and even a necessity."

ness over the President's travels abroad, which are seen as a most transparent way of diverting attention from the steadily tightening Watergate noose. In particular, Europeans fear that when President Nixon goes to Russia, he will be tempted into some deal that will not be beneficial to the free world, and perhaps harmful to European security.

Clearly, Mr. Nixon needs some kind of success to take the edge off the steady progress toward impeachment being made by the House Judiciary Committee. American prestige is at a high-water mark in the Arab countries as a result of Henry Kissinger's successful diplomacy so Mr. Nixon will be getting a hero's welcome this week in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

But there will be a price to pay, for this new relationship with the Arab world, not only in terms of direct military and economic aid, but in the submerging of our once highly-held notions of multi-lateralism, and a de-emphasis of the idea of independence from foreign oil sources.

Almost farcically, administration officials have tried to say that the bilateral weekend deals with the Saudis have "nothing to do" with oil.

But it should be apparent that the U.S. game is to convince the Saudis that they can safely boost their petroleum output to 20 million barrels a day (our goal for the Saudis in the pre-embargo days), instead of keeping their oil in the ground.

So its back to business as usual pre-embargo—and forget conservation, Project Independence—to say nothing of lower prices.

What has happened to the pious declarations of the Washington Energy Conference last February stressing the need for a multi-lateral approach? What happened to Kissinger's appeals for the consuming nations to stand together, to avoid hasty bilateral deals with the oil countries?

How hollow the toast offered then by Walter Scheel, president of the European Communities Council of Ministers: "It was a good thing that the least dependent country, the United States, has taken the initiative to convene the present conference . . . At long last, the producers and consumers will have to get together to develop a joint concept . . ."

I was among those who sharply criticized the uncooperative posture of former French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who said the American effort was fraudulent, that the U.S. was cozying up to the Saudis while talking about joint effort.

But at this point in time, it looks as if Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger are more interested in an accord with the Saudis that will assure American oil supplies for the long pull ahead than worrying about the rest of the world. Given the need, "P-R wise," for something to help Mr. Nixon's image, that might have a better pay-off than vague notions of international cooperation.

"go-it-alone" diplomacy in the Middle East.

Dr. Kissinger, according to European sources, still opposes any joint European approach to the Arabs—even as the U.S. caps its own Arab diplomacy with a wide-ranging economic and military cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia.

"The French," said one source, "would have been delighted to have made such a deal. In fact, they tried and failed." He referred to the effort of former French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert to exchange French technology and weapons for Saudi oil, a deal rejected by King Faisal.

Comparisons

At the time, Dr. Kissinger criticized

widely copied by other European powers, claiming such long-term arrangements would lock up future oil supplies at ruinously high prices. U.S. officials now point out that the June 8 agreement between the Americans and Saudis is not pegged to future oil deliveries to the U.S.

"If I were a European, however," conceded an American official, "I might think the U.S. was doing exactly what Kissinger condemned the Europeans for trying to do."

In fact, said a European source, Arthur Hartman, Dr. Kissinger's top aide for Europe, recently urged the nine nations of the Common Market not to proceed with their planned approach to the Arabs.

Foreign ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) intend to invite a number of Arab states to discuss long-range economic, technical, and cultural relations between Europe and the Arab world.

This plan surfaced after an inconclusive conference of oil-consuming nations in Washington last February, when Dr. Kissinger's plea for a multilateral approach to oil-exporting nations was rejected by the French.

Eight members of the EEC, seeking a compromise between the U.S. multilateral and French bilateral views, developed the concept of a joint EEC approach to the Arabs.

This idea was bitterly opposed by the United States, which then — through Dr. Kissinger's exhaustive efforts — achieved Israeli-Arab troop disengagement agreements on the Sinai and Golan fronts.

This initial progress toward Arab-Israeli peace brought an end to the Arab oil embargo and, as a by-product, fostered the bilateral U.S.-

Saudi deal.

Countering Soviet influence

An American official, while expressing understanding of Europe's bruised sensibilities, said that European nations lack the "power and weight" to "counter Soviet influence in the Middle East," something the Europeans themselves want done.

In the process, say State Department sources, the United States though developing a "one-to-one" relationship with key Arab leaders, is not seeking to corner Arab oil for Americans.

"Who allocates oil anyway?" remarked a U.S. official. "The major oil companies, not governments." He noted that the majors, by rejugling shipments have kept the Netherlands well supplied with petroleum, though the Dutch still are officially boycotted by the Arabs.

These arguments, however valid, still leave the impression, said a source, that Washington believes the

"Europeans should suspend having any independent foreign policy."

"You really cannot ask," observed a U.S. official, "a group of nations of the importance and pride of Europe, to check with us before they do anything."

Did the United States check with Europe, before signing its Saudi deal? "I gather," replied a diplomat drily, "there was not much consultation."

Talks with American and European diplomats indicate there is no easy way to bridge the current transatlantic disagreement over what role Europe should play vis-a-vis the Arabs.

To Dr. Kissinger, the overriding concern seems to be that nothing interfere with his infinitely complex efforts to forge a stable Middle Eastern peace, a goal sought both by Europe and the U.S.

European governments, on the other hand, see little reason why Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy should exclude development of a complementary relationship between the EEC and the Arab world.

WASHINGTON STAR
2 June 1974

William F. Buckley Jr.: *Brandt's Untold Tale*

I have information on the matter of Willy Brandt which has received inadequate attention, perhaps because it has been treated as highly confidential.

The published story is that Willy Brandt resigned from office because his intelligence people discovered that Gunter Guillaume, an intimate and perhaps his closest aide, was in fact an East German Communist spy. Rather than fight to vindicate himself — so the story goes — Brandt elected to show that famous Prussian manliness by resigning his office, while the editorial organs of the world sang his praises and the curtain closed on Gotterdammerung.

It is, according to people in Germany supposedly in the know, a little more complicated than that.

EARLY IN 1972 — i.e., 18 months ago — the intelligence agency of the West German government solemnly approached Chancellor Brandt and told him that Gunter Guillaume was a Communist agent. The news was altogether stunning. It was as if the CIA had approached Richard Nixon to tell him that Alexander Haig was an enemy agent.

Brandt not only refused to accept the word of his intelligence agency, he ordered that it should be suppressed — I don't know the German word for it, but here they call it a

"The inner circle . . . told Brandt that things were getting so bad, if he didn't resign he might very well face — arrest."

coverup. Brandt demanded "incontrovertible proof" against Guillaume.

This proof was finally furnished early in the year. But at that point Brandt persisted in refusing to fire him. This time he said that to do so would be to shed light on his failure to fire him earlier, and if this transpired, his government would very probably fall. He did not desire his government to fall for all the usual reasons that run through red-blooded politicians, but there was an extra reason besides.

SOMETIME BEFORE he became chancellor, Brandt had a liaison with a German lady who — would you believe it? — was also an East German spy. But this lady, swooning in the arms of the leader of the Social Democratic party, told him that great big beauti-

ful Willy had converted her away from communism, to social democracy. Unfortunately, not long after Brandt became chancellor, the lady, who in the meantime had gone to work for West German intelligence, announced her intention of publishing her memoirs. She suggested \$150,000 would overcome her desire to write.

I don't know what they call that in German, but here they call it blackmail. So apparently Willy Brandt, who didn't have 150,000 of his own dollars sitting about, ordered the intelligence agency to pay over the money to the lady. I don't know what they call that in German, but here they call it malversation, corruption of a federal agency, and all kinds of ugly words, of which Mr. Anthony Lewis keeps the master file.

This proved to be too much, and a few of the close friends of Willy Brandt who are not Communist agents, apparently told him he had to go. The alternative was really too much to contemplate. For one thing, no one could think of a West German secret of the last few years that had not been fondled by Gunter Guillaume. When he was finally arrested, the Moscow press devoted only three lines to the story, and did not deny that Guillaume was one of theirs. The inner circle now told Brandt that things were getting so bad, if he didn't resign he might very well face — arrest.

SO HE WENT. And the press of the Western world gave him fine tributes. The New York Times even permitted itself to wonder whether Brandt hadn't been set up by his right-wing enemies at home, and reminded us of all the enemies of Willy Brandt's cherished Ostpolitik that skulk about the corridors of Bonn. So Brandt strode off the national stage — as far as our press is concerned — something of a hero, making a huge personal sacrifice in expiation of an administrative error that could happen to just plain anybody.

But just plain anybody, by the calculations of, say, Archibald Cox, or Leon Jaworski, was guilty of treasonable neglect and grand larceny.

Near East

THE NEW REPUBLIC
JUNE 15, 1974

India: The Lost Years

by Richard Critchfield

New Delhi

India has lost its one big historic chance to grow enough food. Instead the Malthusian scourge has finally caught up with it: the rural death rate is dramatically rising. The poorest Indians are paying a heavy price for political decisions of the past three years: the loss of American cash, credit and, above all, hundreds of agricultural technicians; their replacement by the economically disadvantageous alliance with Russia; and now India's testing of nuclear weapons and, as the world's seventh largest industrial power, its manufacture of sophisticated jets, tanks, satellites and rockets.

India will not have enough food this year or next year or possibly ever again on a planet with just 27 days' reserves for the entire human population. Just to break even with population growth the earth now has to grow 8.8 million tons more grain each year. Most of mankind lives on rice or wheat and while wheat is holding its own, the growth rate of rice production, at one percent a year, is falling behind a two percent population growth.

Over the years a great many dooms have been predicted for India. It would "go Communist," be conquered by China, break into entirely separate linguistic states, parliamentary government would be overthrown by a military coup or by the communal forces of political Hinduism or, more vaguely, India would simply "go down the drain." None, save a Chinese occupation, is impossible. But most, with the passage of time and the emergence of a fairly prosperous urban middle class and northern farming community, perhaps numbering 100 to 150 million people in all, look increasingly unlikely. There are two Indias today and the modernizing minority is probably strong enough to hold the country together.

What is actually happening was largely unpredicted. Infants and old people, vulnerable because of inadequate diet, are beginning to die by the millions in poor, isolated villages. Indian doctors say that while there is some rise in cholera, smallpox and malaria, the big two new killers are plain old upper respiratory infections and gastroenteritis. Neither was usually fatal a few years ago.

The sudden, calamitous growth of India's population, once it was freed by the spread of medical science, has mostly taken place this century; it has risen by almost 200 million since I first visited India in the late 1950s. Then the rate of natural increases was 1.3 per-

cent; by last year it was 2.5 percent.

Demographers say India will be pressing 700 million by the end of the 1970s and that yearly gains could rise from a present 13 million to 70 million within 26 years. It is now officially admitted that the 1971 census count of 542 million was nine million short; this means India will pass the 600 million mark sometime in early September. Despite 10 years of fairly vigorous family planning—\$80 million is being spent this year—nothing has changed the traditional pattern of rural fertility or pronatalist views shaped by 10,000 years of clinging to a bare existence. By the time the average Indian woman reaches 46 she will have had 5.6 children. By 1989 there will be twice as many childbearing women so that, if mass famine is averted, the geometrical progression of India's population will continue.

Statistics indicate mass famine may quietly be well underway. Rural India's crude death rate first began to rise five years ago, climbing from 14 to 15.7 per 1000 persons by 1970 and 16.9 by 1972, the latest year with overall official data available. But preliminary sample surveys published by the Indian Office of the Registrar General show the death rate in parts of Uttar Pradesh state reached 27.1 per 1000 last year. With the overall rural crude birth rate down to 36.6—though still up in the mid-40s in the poorest areas—India's rate of natural increase is now actually declining, possibly by as much as from 2.5 to 2.1 percent. Some Indians claim this is because of the success of family planning; it is not. It is because more and more Indians are being born, not getting enough to eat and are catching bad colds or stomach aches and dying.

India's famous propaganda slogans of "a small family is a happy family" and "Do ya teen bas!" ("Two or three, finish!") have never been convincing in a village world where more sons mean more rupees coming in to the landless and mean security not only in old age but here and now in violence-ridden countryside. For the poor Indian it remains eminently rational to have many children. It is only the urban middle class and the prosperous farmers of the northern plains who have taken to intrauterine devices and even they have shunned the pill since it causes irregular bleeding (a menstruating Hindu woman cannot cook or go to the temple since she is considered unclean). Indian experience, as well as elsewhere, has been that agricultural advance, and the change in village social values it brings, is the prerequisite for population control.

Indira Gandhi's tragedy of the past three or four years, of which the May nuclear explosion and a Soviet-advised rocket program are just the most alarming parts, is that the orientation of the leftist Kashmiri Brahmins who mostly advise her is so overwhelmingly political. There does not seem to be an apolitical technocrat or sound economist in the lot. It is a milieu more concerned with the superpowers, détente and

RICHARD CRITCHFIELD has spent the past 15 years reporting development in the poor countries; his most recent book is *The Golden Bowl Be Broken* (Indiana University Press, January 1974).

grand imperial strategy: a court that took root in the south, to the Gangetic Plain, the Deccan Plateau and the steamy tropical coasts where most of the 600 million live, but northward to massed Russian and Chinese armies between the Urals and Lake Baikal, to Pakistan where Baluchi and Pathan tribals are in revolt against Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's pro-Chinese government, to Afghanistan, now run by pro-Russian military men and to Iran and the Shah with his growing ties with Delhi and Kabul and no longer so certain of saving Pakistan from any threat of disintegration or invasion by the Indian Army. It is all the Great Game and Henry Kissinger's expected visit this month the next move; its politics are heady but have little to do with India's 500,000 villages. There, people are starving.

Take for example D. P. Dhar, chairman of India's Planning Commission, former ambassador to Moscow, and a fellow Kashmiri Hindu Brahmin who is perhaps Mrs. Gandhi's most trusted adviser and trouble-shooter. Dhar was Mrs. Gandhi's chief strategist on the break-up of Pakistan and the security treaty with Russia as well as a two-way one-billion-dollar trade package this year with the Soviet bloc that gives India a lot of paper credits, some obsolete technology and shoddy machine tools, and quite a lot of arms and political support in exchange for transferring many more valuable resources up north than are flowing back. The Soviet Union has supplied two million tons of wheat, one million of which is now being offloaded in Calcutta, and may give India two million more; but this year's Russian wheat crop is expected to be poor, with sowing delayed two weeks by frost, and Russia cannot supply India with the fuel, fertilizer and technical assistance it needs. Dhar, who has also negotiated deferred payment oil deals and mineral development with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, represents the kind of Russian-minded-development thinking that pushes rapid industrialization without first putting agriculture on a sound basis.

Mrs. Gandhi's greatest chance to feed India's people and create economic conditions where family planning might take hold came with the great American scientific breakthrough in tropical agriculture in 1967: the widespread introduction of new high-yielding strains of dwarf wheat and rice. The so-called green revolution, which really took hold during Mrs. Gandhi's second year in office in 1968, doubled wheat yields on the California-like, highly irrigated Punjab plain and brought India virtual self-sufficiency in food by 1971. This bonanza, which ensured Mrs. Gandhi's popularity during her early years, fell in her lap. The first seed plots of the new wheat were planted in India in 1964 just before her father Jawaharlal Nehru died. This burst of agricultural abundance covered up a great deal of economic mismanagement in the late 1960s and early 1970s and allowed Mrs. Gandhi to steer India on its present pro-Soviet course and invest heavily in an armaments industry and nuclear race whose grim domestic harvest will be increasingly evident late this year and early next.

A great many people have misunderstood the nature of the green revolution; Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers seem to have been among them. It is no one-shot thing; it is a long-term continuous process of transferring American farm technology and this requires the continuous presence of American technicians—especially plant breeders, geneticists and agronomists—to find

scientific answers to problems of environmental adjustment and ecological backlash as they crop up. What we call the green revolution is essentially the geographical transfer of new high-yielding seeds, irrigation, mechanization and the massive application of chemical fertilizer and, most important, the knowledge that goes with this. In countries like India in the late 1960s it came so fast that when the first spectacular results diminished, palpably absurd and trendy articles began appearing that the green revolution had "withered" or "failed" or whatever. But the green revolution is not an event but a process that will just go on, transforming for good and bad rural societies all over the earth.

Since the suspension of US assistance and the souring of relations after the 1971 Bangladesh war, literally hundreds of American farm technicians, sponsored by the Agency for International Development and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, have quit India and gone home. The US aid program, up to a peak of \$877 million and 236 highly skilled professionals in 1966, most of them involved with agriculture, is now down to a \$50 million a year infant and pregnant mother feeding scheme and nine Americans, almost all of them purely administrators. The Rockefeller Foundation, which focused entirely in India on agriculture research, mostly developing constantly newer, high-yielding varieties, gave up and pulled out of India two years ago. Ford, which focused on the practical application of technology and had a large group of farm experts working closely with the Indian Agriculture Ministry, is down to a skeleton crew of non-technicians.

Mrs. Gandhi and her people do not seem to grasp what a monumental misjudgment they made in allowing a state of affairs where most of the American farm experts have pulled out. You cannot continue to transfer American farm technology without them. M. G. Kaul, one of Mrs. Gandhi's key economic advisers, told me that old government-to-government technical assistance programs brought mostly "second-raters" to India, since they were the only ones willing to stay three or four years. "If you want top people," he said, "you have to pay for them and they'll only stay four or five months." He cited some Canadian copper miners as an example. Kaul's observation may be valid for industry but not agriculture. The green revolution is the product of the land grant colleges and US agricultural service and the vast amount of expertise gathered in the past 80 years; almost all these men, directly or indirectly, are financed by the government. As one of the few Western agricultural experts left in Delhi said, throwing up his hands in exasperation, "I don't know where Mrs. Gandhi's people are, on Mars or somewhere; they're certainly not in India!"

This is brought home to you up on the fertile Punjab plain, which produces India's main marketable food surplus; it has been the main setting of the green revolution and, after 1967, the spectacular transformation from subsistence agriculture to modern commercial farming. Its hardy Moslem, Sikh and Hindu Jat Punjabi farmers, acre for acre, have been producing the highest wheat yields on earth. This is the region primarily responsible for the rapid rise in the use of scientific inputs in Indian agriculture. Since 1961 fertilizer consumption has risen from 300,000 tons to 3.1 million tons with a present estimated demand of five million tons; electric and diesel pumps from 420,000 to 2.1 million; tubewells from 19,000 to 718,000; tractors from

31,000 to 173,000 and the number of acres planted in new high-yielding varieties from two to 23 million hectares.

I spent 10 days touring rural villages here—unhappily being caught in one when the reportedly none-too-clean plutonium explosion went off May 18 on the Rajasthan desert some 300 miles to the west of us—and expected to find water and power shortages and diesel fuel and fertilizer available only at black market prices. They were, but this was not the main trouble. The farmers' chief complaint was that "there is no good new seed." They said the first three new wheat varieties introduced in the late 1960s—Khalyan Sona, PV-18 and 308—were the only good ones and that those put out by Indian research institutions since 1971 had been fiascos, either rust-prone, subject to insects, just plain low-yielding or with serious environmental problems. Others said heavy dosages of nitrogen since 1967 had left the soil deficient in potash and other minerals but that no one was supplying the technical assistance to remedy this.

Per acre yields that were two or 1.8 tons four years ago are down to 1.4 to 1.3 tons even in Punjab's richest district of Ludhiana. Mrs. Gandhi's economists talk about procuring seven million tons to keep the urban public food distribution system going. They will be lucky to get four or five million. The wheat harvest just threshed, hoped to be 30 million tons, may reach less than 23 million tons. Although Mrs. Gandhi has raised the procurement price per 100 kilos from \$9.88 to \$13.65, farmers angrily say this is still too high to offset high fuel and fertilizer costs; they demand "parity." Many are hoarding their wheat at home for the first time. Food is politics in India and if Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta and such deficient states as Kerala cannot get enough to avoid shortages and runaway prices, Mrs. Gandhi will be in real trouble by September. And needlessly.

A few days before the nuclear blast Dr. M. S. Swaminathan, director of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and perhaps the leading farming authority in India, told me India could raise food production from the present 105 million tons to 220 million tons within 15 years provided it had the water, power, cash, credit and technical assistance. Swaminathan, an old-fashioned technocrat, said he was looking forward to the World Food Conference in Rome this fall; he wistfully recalled President Kennedy's 1961 prediction that America not only had the means to set foot on the moon but the technology to totally eradicate hunger from the earth. Swaminathan was full of schemes to triple fertilizer production, irrigate the vast Gangetic plain and ensure water control with cheap \$3.10 bamboo tubewells, introduce special new grain varieties for the three-fourths of India's total acreage that is not irri-

gated and so on. Implicit in what he said was a return of American aid and technology.

The inflation rate of the past 12 months is somewhere between 22 and 29 percent; a kilo of rice can be bought for 13 cents at government fair price shops in the cities but out in the villages costs up to 26 cents. Mazdoors or landless laborers make 26, 39 or 52 cents a day when they can get work—power shortages and loss of water has dried up crops in parts of once irrigated areas. The arithmetic is such that landless laborers with the national average of 5.6 children cannot possibly feed their families. One can visit starving villages two or three hours from Delhi.

Nutritionists say an average Indian adult consumes 170 kilos of grain a year, a Southeast Asian 182, a Chinese 200 and an American 1000. When an Indian laborer with a family of eight has to feed them on 70 ounces a day, this is slow starvation.

Besides the Russian wheat, India has bought about one million tons abroad so far, 200,000 tons from the US. But it cannot buy much more. India faces a \$2.4 billion balance of payments deficit this year and the World Bank-sponsored Aid India Consortium, even before Japan and other countries threatened to cut off aid after the nuclear blast, had seen only \$1.3 million in aid and a 50 percent debt rescheduling as the maximum achievable target. And \$200 to \$300 million of this was hoped to come from Congress replenishing the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's soft loan arm. Congress has yet to act. Meanwhile, India has drawn a few hundred million from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but not on concessional terms and while it won \$200 million in immediate relief on oil payments to Iran, the money still has to be paid with interest, within five years. With exports doubling to five billion dollars since 1972, imports expected to make no more than \$3.2 billion and only \$1.4 billion in foreign exchange reserves, India badly needs more liquidity to import spare parts, fertilizer, fuel and food. It probably won't get it since the nuclear explosion gave the West and Japan the justification needed to turn their backs.

Yet if India loses, so does everybody. American grocery prices will keep on going up as long as world food grain prices do, and it will be hard to avoid a global recession if the world's seventh biggest industrial power collapses.

Somehow Mrs. Gandhi has got to realize that the transfer of American farm technology to India must take precedence above all else. To allow her advisers to convince her otherwise, at a time the Russians are eagerly seeking American industrial technology themselves, is tragic. Three years have been lost already.

The Value of Diego Garcia

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

NEW DELHI—On maps of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia appears as a scarcely visible dot. Until a few years ago, this British-controlled coral atoll 1,200 miles south of India had a population of barely 500 and a modest annual production of copra, salt fish and tortoise shell.

Last year, the United States Navy turned the island into an "austere" communications center. Today, the Navy is seeking \$32.3-million to expand the station into a full-scale naval and air support facility that would probably bring nuclear-armed B-52's into an area designated a "zone of peace" by the United Nations General Assembly in 1971. As a result, once-insignificant Diego Garcia has become a focus of international controversy.

Navy Seabees are now engaged in preliminary dredging operations on Diego Garcia and awaiting a Congressional go-ahead to extend the runway enough to permit safe landing of the KC-135, a large air tanker used primarily to refuel B-52's. They are also preparing to create oil storage facilities and to build berthing piers that would accommodate aircraft carriers.

The expectation is that funds for the work will be granted. Nevertheless, opposition has developed both inside and outside of Congress, and the United Nations is to take up the issue. Already, a panel of United Nations experts has warned that expansion of Diego Garcia could lead to an Indian Ocean arms race.

American officials argue that there has been a "dramatic rise" in Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean, and that the Russians will further intensify operations when the Suez Canal, a key entrance to the ocean, reopens.

The Soviet Union began continuous naval operations in the Indian Ocean in 1968. It has bases on Socotra Island in the ocean and at nearby Aden, as well as easy access to port facilities in India and elsewhere. The Russians have no active combat troops in the ocean, but their force there is believed to include one large destroyer, one escort, two minesweepers, a submarine and ten support ships, along with four or five minesweepers and support ships based in Chittagong, Bangladesh.

By contrast, the United States is now represented by a single amphibious command ship and two destroyers, supplemented from time to time with carrier task forces from other areas.

Both the Navy and the State Department argue that the United States must establish a genuinely counter-balancing naval force in an area that controls the sea lanes to Middle Eastern oil. Without a presence in the Indian Ocean, without fuel and repair facilities, without logistic support in the third largest ocean in the world, officials say, the United States would forfeit a large share of its naval position to the Russians. There is particular concern that the diminishing British and American presence in Asia as a whole is leaving a vacuum that the Russians are intent upon filling.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the United States Naval Chief of Operations, recently testified that "events such as the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo and ensuing price rises show that our interests in the Indian Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia, and, more broadly, with our fundamental interest in maintaining a stable, world-wide balance of power . . ."

The implication is that a Diego Garcia base would make a specific difference to U.S. defense capabilities. It would be the only base that could be used to strike targets in both China and the Soviet Union.

More importantly, the base would reduce U.S. dependence on Subic Bay in the Philippines, 5,000 miles away, for any action in the Indian Ocean. During the Bangladesh war it took the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise seven days to sail from the Pacific to enter the ocean. From Diego Garcia, a ship could reach any port in the area within 48 hours.

More generally, experience has shown that a heavy United States presence has a tempering effect on nations locked in conflict and makes easier the big-power task of containing local conflicts.

Opponents of Diego Garcia resent these rationalizations. In India, the project has deepened anti-American sentiment, and friendly countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia have opposed it on the ground that it could raise tensions.

Some Americans agree. The most forceful critics are those who say that in the post-Vietnam era the United States should have learned her lesson about military incursions in Asia.

Chester Bowles, the former ambassador to India, has written, "If we intend to frighten the Russians or others out of the Indian Ocean, it is a laughable gesture. If we intend to demonstrate our continued interest in Asia by setting up shop on Asian 'turf,' we should think hard about our past experience in such Asian ventures." And he concludes, "There is still time to reevaluate our plans for Diego Garcia."

The Forces in the Indian Ocean

UNITED STATES

- 1 amphibious command ship
- 2 destroyers

SOVIET UNION

- 1 large destroyer
- 1 escort
- 2 minesweepers
- 1 submarine
- 10 support ships

- 4 or 5 minesweepers
- and support ships, in Chittagong

BRITAIN

- 1 destroyer escort
- several oilers

FRANCE

- 1 guided missile patrol ship
- 2 destroyers (1 for missiles)
- 2 destroyer escorts
- 4 coastal patrol ships
- 1 oiler
- 1 landing craft

- 1 net layer
- some naval patrol aircraft, which operate from Djibouti

INDIA

- 1 aircraft carrier
- 2 cruisers
- 6 destroyers (3 DDE's)

- 24 frigates (including 4 building)


- 4 patrol submarines

IRAN

- 3 destroyers
- 4 frigates
- 4 corvettes
- 2 landing craft
- 10 patrol boats
- 6 minesweepers
- 14 hovercraft (2 building)

PAKISTAN

- 1 light cruiser
- 4 destroyers
- 2 frigates
- 3 patrol submarines
- 7 coastal minesweepers



THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 2, 1974

A Top Economist in India Criticizes New Delhi's Farm Policies

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, May 18 — A major Indian economist, who recently broke with the Government, has written a strong attack on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's policies.

The economist, B. S. Minhas, who resigned in December from the nation's Planning Commission, ended his public silence this week and said that India's policies were guided by "competitive radicalism," that the Government "has lost its moral authority to govern" and that "there has been an appalling neglect of agriculture and rural development."

The 44-year-old economist, who has taught at Stanford and the University of Illinois, said: "A mood of utter despondency stalks the nation. In the course of the past two years, things have changed in a manner which has reduced the economy to shambles."

Mr. Minhas's criticisms were embodied in a long three-part series in The Hindustan Times. It was the first time that the economist has published his views since his angry departure from the Planning Commission. Mr. Minhas privately maintained then that the planners were juggling figures to present an unrealistically bright picture of India, and that the nation's priorities had been distorted.

Mr. Minhas is a mentor to some of the nation's respected younger economists and was a friend of Mrs. Gandhi. He has argued his case privately in Government circles.

Perhaps his key point is that

India, under Nehru as well as Mrs. Gandhi, "has failed to appreciate the crucial role of agriculture. From plan to plan we laid to increase our dependence on foreign supplies of food and agricultural raw materials."

At another point, Mr. Minhas says, "We have not put in the requisite effort to produce food and agricultural raw materials at home." Instead, he argues, India has concentrated on a "heavy industry first" policy, such as the development of steel and machine-tool plants. This was designed to make India less dependent on imports of key industrial items.

But Mr. Minhas says that the policy fails to take into account India's crucial and overwhelming need for food. "This has given rise to a not inconsiderable misuse of national resources," he said. "Today we are not only importing food, we are also importing large quantities of fertilizer, machinery to make fertilizers, machinery to make fertilizer machinery as well as its grand-parents."

"This policy," he said, "has made us even more dependent on imports than we ever were or needed to be."

Although Mr. Minhas insists that India should shift gears and "give the highest priority to agricultural production and rural development," he adds that the nation's current plan "has confirmed my worst fears."

He says that the outlay for agriculture in the current 1974-75 plan, from April to March, amounts to about \$850-million. The corresponding figures in the last two years were more than \$1-billion. More-

over, he says, in the current five-year plan, from 1974-79, only 12.7 per cent of the public sector funds are allocated for agriculture and irrigation for the masses but by the masses.

"The neglect of agriculture is unpardonable," said Mr. Minhas. "The homespun insights of Gandhi can provide all the basic building blocks for the relevant model," he added.

"My emphasis on the urgent need for a shift from the heavy

FORECAST

WASHINGTON POST
2 June 1974

By Tad Szulc

This account of the complex negotiations that led to American military disengagement from the Vietnam war is based on new information pieced together from a wide variety of sources in Washington, Paris and elsewhere by Szulc, a Washington writer, in the course of his research for a new book on the foreign policy of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger (to be published by the Viking Press early next year).

VIETNAM: THE SECRET RECORD

THE EXTRAORDINARY diplomatic story behind the secret 1972 and 1973 negotiations leading to the Vietnam peace agreement and subsequent events may never be told publicly in its complex entirety—it certainly would not serve the Nixon administration to do so—but sufficient new material is now available to permit at least a partial reconstruction of what happened, and how, during these hectic years and months.

This reconstruction, based on heretofore unpublished accounts of the negotiations, a lengthy secret State Department document providing the internal interpretation of the agreement by the U.S. government and fresh insights into our negotiating position, includes these highlights:

- The United States has made a series of secret commitments to North Vietnam, most of which have remained unfulfilled, to implement the Peace agreement. The most important commitment covered the removal, within a year, of all American civilians in South Vietnam engaged in supporting South Vietnamese armed forces. Simultaneously, the United States has secretly counseled Saigon on how to bend certain military provisions of the cease-fire, the ban on procuring more sophisticated planes and shipping arms to Cambodia up the Mekong River.

- The United States and North Vietnam successfully negotiated, except for one unresolved point, an agreement on American aid to Hanoi for economic reconstruction. The accord was reached in principle late in March, 1973, but the administration shelved it because of its displeasure over Communist truce violations. Both the agreement and the shelving have been kept secret.

- American military aid to South Vietnam is currently coordinated through a special "covert" section in the office of the defense attache in the American embassy in Saigon. The section is a "minicommand" with over 100 personnel. It reports to a U.S. military headquarters in Thailand.

- The real turning point in the negotiations came not in Paris, but Moscow, when Henry Kissinger indicated to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, during a secret visit late in April, 1972, that the United States, in effect, no longer demanded the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam as a prior condition. The following month, at the Moscow summit, Kissinger stunned the Russians with a proposal for a tripartite electoral commission in South Vietnam. Apparently with Soviet and Chinese diplomatic help, the United States then won, as a *quid pro quo*, Hanoi's willingness to drop its insistence on South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's removal prior to a cease-fire. These events led to the North Vietnamese secret peace proposal in October, 1972, and ultimately to the settlement.

- Throughout most of the negotiating process in 1972, Kissinger kept Saigon in the dark about his diplomacy.

As late as August, he encouraged Thieu to prepare for an invasion of North Vietnam after the U.S. presidential elections. Only in October, however, did he acknowledge

to Thieu that the United States was no longer demanding the departure of Hanoi's forces from the South.

- Kissinger also misled Cambodian President Lon Nol in October, 1972, when he claimed that he had Hanoi's assurances for a simultaneous cease-fire in Cambodia and Vietnam. In this connection, the secret State Department interpretation document discloses that Article 20 of the Paris agreement was deliberately drafted in such a way as to permit the United States to conduct air operations over Cambodia and Laos until a cease-fire there and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The administration had not counted on the subsequent congressional action banning air operations in Cambodia.

The truly fascinating aspect of the secret diplomatic history of the peace talks was Kissinger's (and, presumably, President Nixon's) ability to develop completely distinct public and private negotiating positions—particularly during 1972—and the manipulation of foe and friend alike. This was done against the background of increasingly hostile public opinion at home—the antiwar movement was at its apex by 1971—and in the context of Kissinger's conviction that the key to a Vietnam settlement was a detente with both the Soviet Union and China. Conversely, Kissinger believed that detente could flourish in the long run only with the liquidation of the Vietnam war. Thus, in 1971, the strands of U.S. policies toward Moscow, Peking and Hanoi began coming together as Kissinger wove an intricate diplomatic fabric in the Communist world.

There were also two other cardinal concepts governing the Kissinger policy: One was that the United States had to extricate itself from Vietnam sooner or later—even if it meant a potential break with Saigon, as Thieu was to discover in good time—and the other was his unshakable belief, expressed privately in 1969, after his first secret meetings with the North Vietnamese, that the breakthrough in negotiations could come only after a final paroxysm of battle. He was, of course, proved right in 1972. Meanwhile, his diplomacy was designed to

keep everybody off balance—Thieu and Lon Nol on one side and the North Vietnamese, the Russians, and the Chinese on the other. It is even possible that Mr. Nixon did not fully understand at all times what his special assistant for national security affairs was doing.

All along it was an exercise in diplomatic brinkmanship on many fronts. One false step could bring the collapse of the whole Kissinger diplomatic edifice—and he came rather close to it on more than one occasion. In any event, Kissinger could perforce operate only in total secrecy, not only from the public but often from many of the other principal actors in the Vietnam drama.

I. Going to Moscow

FOR NEARLY TWO YEARS from their start on Aug. 4, 1969, Kissinger's secret Paris meetings with the North Vietnamese made no visible progress. During 1971, some promising movement seemed to develop after Kissinger unveiled a new secret peace plan on May 31, but the year ended in bitter disappointment as the North Vietnamese ignored an improved U.S. offer in October, and as reports from Indochina warned of preparations for a major Communist offensive early in 1972.

Around Jan. 20, 1972, the White House became so alarmed both by the North Vietnamese buildup and Hanoi's continued silence concerning resumption of the secret sessions that the decision was made to "go public" with the October peace proposal and the disclosure that Kissinger had been intermittently holding private sessions with the Communists since August, 1969. The idea of "going public" had been considered for a number of months—Kissinger discussed it often with his staff—because of growing frustration with Hanoi and, just as importantly, because of domestic public opinion. In White House parlance, the disclosure was made for the "theater"—to confound criticism that the administration was not actively pursuing peace in Vietnam.

President Nixon went public in a dramatic speech to the nation on Jan. 25, 1972, telling the story of Kissinger's secret trips and revealing the October peace proposal. Mr. Nixon said that "until recently" the system of secret negotiations "showed signs of yielding some progress." But as he spoke to the nation, prospects for successful diplomacy had hit their lowest point in years.

Still, both sides spent two more months in diplomatic charades before the explosion that ultimately led to the peace agreement a year later. The day after the Nixon speech, the White House sent a private message to Hanoi indicating readiness to resume secret talks. But this suggestion was dispatched in the midst of extraordinary expressions of public hostility. On Feb. 5, North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris talks, Xuan Thuy, suddenly denied that Kissinger had offered to set a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal as part of the May 31 peace plan in exchange for a cease-fire and the release of the POWs. For its part, the White House denied Thuy's claim that North Vietnam had agreed the previous summer to separate political from military problems—an issue that all along had been at the center of the whole stalemate. On Feb. 6, Thuy further escalated the dispute with the announcement that the POWs would be released only after Washington abandoned Thieu and brought the war to an end.

Despite this increasingly bitter polemic, Hanoi advised Washington on Feb. 14 that it would be agreeable to the resumption of secret talks after March 15. On Feb. 17, the day Mr. Nixon and Kissinger left for Peking, they informed Hanoi that March 20 would be a suitable date. This was accepted by the North Vietnamese 12 days later, when the presidential party was already home from China. But on March 6, the North Vietnamese asked for a postponement until April 15. Kissinger, who was planning a Tokyo trip on that date, proposed April 24. Hanoi agreed on March 31, only after the United States angrily interrupted semipublic sessions in Paris.

The launching of the North Vietnamese offensive on March 30 explains why Hanoi combined its new public hostility toward the United States with foot-dragging on the resuming of secret negotiations in preceeding weeks. What is unexplained is why the Nixon administration failed to perceive in time what was happening. Kissinger himself admitted later that only on Easter Sunday did

he realize that Saigon was facing a full-fledged offensive and that the North Vietnamese were "going for broke" in a last desperate attempt to smash the South Vietnamese army before a peace settlement. This is particularly perplexing when one considers that Kissinger had always believed that peace would ultimately come only after a final outbreak of heavy fighting. Still, the overwhelming concern in the White House was the just-concluded trip to China and the approaching Moscow summit. As a senior White House official remarked at the time, Vietnam was a "cruel side show" in the Administration's new worldwide policies.

When the scope of the Communist offensive was finally realized, a touch of panic developed in the White House. The fall of Quangtri during April deepened the concern, as well as the growing belief that the United States must intervene massively to save Saigon from collapse. Kissinger was portrayed by his associates as fearing that the ARVN could not hold its own.

By mid-April, the overhanging question was how to move decisively in Vietnam without, at the same time, destroying the chances for the Moscow summit scheduled for May. Mr. Nixon dispatched Kissinger to the Soviet capital to explore the situation with Brezhnev, and to enlist his support for convincing Hanoi to cease the offensive.

Kissinger in Moscow

THE KISSINGER MISSION to Moscow on April 20 was shrouded in total secrecy. The Air Force jet that brought him from Andrews Air Force Base landed at a Soviet domestic airfield near Moscow rather than at Vnukovo international airport where the white-and-blue plane might have been spotted. Soviet government limousines took Kissinger's party to an estate known as Dom Pryoma in the Lenin Hills about 15 minutes away from Moscow.

So great was the secrecy that except for a surreptitious visit to the Kremlin on their last evening in the Soviet Union, Kissinger and his staff never came to Moscow. An advance White House team headed by Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, also in Moscow to prepare the Nixon visit, was never told of Kissinger's presence, and apparently neither was the American ambassador, Jacob D. Beam. For four days, Kissinger and his staff, including Helmut Sonnenfeldt (now counselor of the State Department), met with Brezhnev and his advisers at the Chairman's private *dacha* at the Zavidova estate 40 miles away. With Brezhnev were Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, Andrei Alexandrov (Brezhnev's personal foreign policy adviser) and an interpreter.

Subsequently, Kissinger publicly disclosed his secret meetings with Brezhnev. He said that the Vietnam situation was discussed "at considerable length," but he gave no details.

What Kissinger has not made public to this day is that his sessions with Brezhnev produced what probably was the first major turning point in the history of the Vietnam negotiations. He told an astonished Brezhnev that the United States would be willing to accept a cease-fire in place in exchange for the departure of the North Vietnamese forces which had entered South Vietnam since the start of the offensive on March 30.

This was a veritable diplomatic bomb; Washington had never before explicitly agreed to let any North Vietnamese forces stay in the South. An offhand calculation at that point was that between 30,000 and 40,000 fresh

North Vietnamese troops had entered South Vietnam since the offensive. Kissinger was telling Brezhnev that Washington would not demand the evacuation of the estimated 100,000 North Vietnamese who had been in the South prior to the offensive.

This offer has to be carefully analyzed to understand Kissinger's secret diplomacy. A concession of enormous magnitude was being made to Hanoi via the Russians. Since May 31, 1971, secret American peace proposals had hinted that the United States was not inflexible on the question of North Vietnamese forces, central as this was to the long-range survival of the Saigon regime. The October, 1971, proposal had left the matter deliberately ambiguous with the use of the phrase that all armed forces of "the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers." Since Hanoi always took the view that Vietnam was "one country" with "two armies," the North Vietnamese were given the latitude to interpret this phrase as they wished. But they had never been told clearly that their forces could remain in the South.

In the past, Mr. Nixon had used the expression "cease-fire in place," but it was always taken to mean that a settlement including "mutual withdrawals" would then be negotiated. This concept was repeatedly rejected by Hanoi. Speaking with Brezhnev, however, Kissinger was linking his secret offer with the insistence that Hanoi stop demanding Thieu's removal before any agreement. Thus he later indicated to Brezhnev that the United States would not impose a Communist government on Saigon and wanted, instead, a "genuine political solution." Kissinger also reminded Brezhnev that the American proposal of May, 1971, implicitly carried the same notion.

Now the idea was for Brezhnev to transmit the new feature of the American position to Hanoi, so that a basis could be established for resuming secret negotiations leading to the cessation of fighting and a final settlement. Brezhnev agreed to do so, and Kissinger thus could report publicly, two weeks later, that the Russians "felt that every effort should be made to resume negotiations."

Risking the Summit

SHORTLY AFTER KISSINGER returned to Washington, word was received that Hanoi was ready for a secret meeting in Paris on May 2. But, meanwhile, the military situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated to such a point that Mr. Nixon and Kissinger began to plan retaliatory action against North Vietnam: massive bombings of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and of all North Vietnamese communications lines, and the mining of the port of Haiphong. Kissinger felt, however, that it was essential to hold the meeting with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho before a final decision was taken to strike at the North.

Kissinger and a small staff left Andrews on the evening of May 1, reaching Paris the following morning under the cover of secrecy. He met with Tho for nearly four hours. The meeting produced no results.

North Vietnam, apparently flushed with its military successes, was in no mood to negotiate and the American party flew home the same evening. The May 2 meeting was the first one between Kissinger and Tho since Sept. 13, 1971. Kissinger, who had been frequently telling his staff in the crisis period that since the United States could not weaken North Vietnam through diplomacy it had to do so through force, now concluded that the time for action had come.

At 6 p.m. on Friday, May 5, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, then Kissinger's deputy, summoned a meeting of National Security Council staffers in the White House Situation Room to inform them that it was "98 per cent certain"

that the President would order bombings of North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong. He said that a full meeting of the NSC was scheduled for 9 a.m. on Monday, May 8, and that the staff had the weekend to "game out" the plans.

At noon on Saturday, Kissinger conducted a preparatory meeting attended by Haig, George Carver of the CIA, Sonnenfeldt as the Soviet expert, John Holdridge as the China expert, and several NSC staffers. He went around the table asking for opinions. Carver said the CIA supported the bombing and mining plan because it could result in great pressures on the Hanoi leadership. This was a departure from the standing CIA position against violent retaliatory acts. Sonnenfeldt said Moscow would not increase its involvement in the Vietnam conflict unless a Soviet ship in Haiphong were hit by American bombs, but he gave even odds that the forthcoming summit might be cancelled by the Russians. Holdridge said he doubted China would respond violently. Haig supported the plan so long as it called for a sustained effort over an adequate time period.

Kissinger was described as agonizing over the decision. He paced back and forth, wondering aloud whether, after all, it would be wise policy. He knew instinctively that Mr. Nixon favored action, but he expressed doubts as to whether it was worth the risk because the ARVN might collapse anyway and the United States had already done enough for Saigon. In the end, according to associates, he was able to rationalize the need for the bombing and the mining. The NSC staff spent all Sunday coordinating operations with the Pentagon, preparing to notify the Soviets, Chinese and others of the U.S. actions, and drafting the Nixon speech. The first draft was written by Winston Lord, an assistant to Kissinger.

On Monday, May 8, the full NSC met with the President. Mr. Nixon invited all the members to give their opinions. CIA Director Richard M. Helms, the first to speak, appeared to have little enthusiasm for the bombing and mining on the theory that materiel could be easily moved to North Vietnam overland by railway from China. Secretary of State William P. Rogers then spoke out strongly against both measures. He told the President that we had already done enough for South Vietnam.

In his opening remarks, Mr. Nixon told the group that they faced a tough situation, in view of the approaching Moscow summit, but that in reality a Soviet ally had invaded an ally of the United States. He said that he did not wish to hear the argument that retaliation against North Vietnam would kill the Moscow summit, because the President of the United States was not prepared to go to the Soviet Union if it did nothing to discourage an attack on America's ally.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was outspoken against both actions. He argued that Vietnamization was working well, that Hue had not yet been taken by the Communists, and that the ARVN was proving itself. Besides, Laird said, the Pentagon already had a \$4 billion deficit in 1972 and the Navy had expended all the ammunition allocated for the current fiscal year.

Treasury Secretary John Connally was the strongest advocate of retaliation. As one of the participants described it, Connally practically jumped out of his chair, pointing his finger at Mr. Nixon and saying that, in effect, he would not be a real President if he failed to act. He made disparaging comments about Laird's reservations. Vice President Agnew strongly favored the decision "to go." The only comment Kissinger made during the whole meeting was that there was a 50-50 chance that the Soviets would cancel the summit if the United States engaged in the bombing and mining.

A participant said later that if a secret ballot had been taken at the meeting, the decision might have gone

against the bombing of the North. But few of the NSC members seemed disturbed about the mining of Haiphong. The President ended the meeting at noon, saying that he would make his decision soon. He did so a few minutes before 2 p.m. Word went out immediately to the military to launch the operations.

President Nixon spoke to the nation at 9 p.m. to announce his decision. The most notable feature of this speech was the omission of any suggestion that a North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South was required as a condition to cease the bombing and the mining. Unlike his Jan. 25 speech, the President did not mention the need for the armed forces of Indochinese countries to "remain within their national frontiers." This was consistent with the offer Kissinger had made to Brezhnev two weeks earlier.

The omission of any reference to North Vietnamese withdrawals was deliberate. It was part of the Nixon-Kissinger "stick-and-carrot" policy designed to achieve an acceptable settlement of the Vietnam war during the election year of 1972. It is known that as early as 1970, an NSC staff review of Indochina cease-fire consequences had convinced Kissinger that there was no way to win the removal of the North Vietnamese from the South. Until the May 8 speech, therefore, the United States had been simply paying lip service to this notion. In other words, the official U.S. position had now become that a permanent cease-fire in place was to follow the end of the fighting. Inevitably the conclusion was reached that in the end Saigon would have to cope with a military "leopard spots" situation in the South.

Nixon in Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE won the gamble—the Russians did not cancel the summit. Mr. Nixon flew to Moscow assured now that Brezhnev wished to be helpful in settling the war.

The Americans and the Russians held four discussions about Vietnam. The first one was on May 24 at the Dom Pryama estate where Brezhnev entertained Mr. Nixon for dinner. Mr. Nixon was accompanied by Kissinger and two NSC staffers. Brezhnev, however, brought along President Nikolai Podgorny, Premier Alexei Kosygin, and Alexandrov, his foreign policy expert.

The session began shortly before 8 p.m. and lasted until 11:30 p.m. when Brezhnev finally called a recess for dinner. Mr. Nixon took the floor first and spoke for about 20 minutes, making the point that if the Soviet Union's allies attack America's allies with Soviet equipment, the United States has no choice but to react. Mr. Nixon went on to say that the United States had laid out its negotiating terms and that if Hanoi did not find them acceptable, we would pursue the bombing and the mining.

Kosygin, Podgorny and Brezhnev each spoke for about one hour, in that order. They were critical of the American policies in Vietnam, but said, in effect, that there was nothing the Soviet Union could do about it. The most bitter speech was delivered by Kosygin, who recalled: "I was in Hanoi when the Americans started bombing Hanoi and I shall never forget it." This was a reference to the 1965 bombings. But, as Sonnenfeldt had predicted, even Kosygin confined his protest to the danger of a Soviet ship being hit by American bombs. The thrust of Brezhnev's remarks was that detente was moving ahead, so why should the United States spoil it all by destroying North Vietnam and being condemned for it by the rest of the world? None of the three Russians suggested that the continuing war in Vietnam was an obstacle to detente. At one point, Kosygin turned to Mr. Nixon and said: "You have Henry Kissinger, he's a smart man, why don't you get him to find the right solution for the war?" The meeting went on for so long that Mr. Nixon turned to Kissinger

to whisper: "God, this cannot go on like this." Then, in a rather unusual gesture, Mr. Nixon lit a small cigar. The sumptuous dinner was all cordiality, Kosygin leading the toasts with Georgian brandy. Mr. Nixon had two or three brandies, bottoms-up.

The second meeting on Vietnam was held between Kissinger and Gromyko at the Kremlin in the afternoon of May 25. There Kissinger dropped two more diplomatic bombs. After Gromyko made it clear that the Soviet Union could live with the existing situation in Vietnam, Kissinger told him that the American air action over North Vietnam did not necessarily have to continue until all the POWs were returned. This was an abrupt departure from the position stated by Mr. Nixon in his speech only two weeks earlier that the return of the prisoners was the first condition for the end of the bombing of the North. Thus, again, Kissinger was producing a secret diplomatic track at variance with the public U.S. position. Clearly, he was using the bombing as a bargaining chip.

Kissinger's second bomb that afternoon was his sudden introduction of the theme of the political situation in Vietnam. This had not been discussed the previous evening by the principals and was also a departure from the Nixon speech of May 8, in which no mention at all was made of Vietnamese politics. Kissinger announced that the United States was prepared to back a tripartite electoral commission in South Vietnam, including elements from the Saigon regime, the Vietcong and the neutralists.

This was a real shift in the American stance: The United States had opposed such a tripartite commission all along out of fear that it could evolve into a coalition government, something Saigon and Washington had always rejected. The secret American proposal of October, 1971, had spoken only of an "independent body," representing all political forces in South Vietnam, to organize and run the elections. It had been a far cry from a tripartite commission. Gromyko was so taken aback that he said to Kissinger, "Let me make quite sure I got right what you said." Kissinger replied: "Yes, I'm talking about a tripartite commission."

Kissinger and Gromyko discussed Vietnam again on May 26, covering roughly the same ground. The net effect of these discussions was that the United States made it clear to the Russians that its private negotiating position was infinitely more flexible than the public posture. This covered the North Vietnamese presence in the South, the willingness to suspend bombing even before the release of the POWs and the support for a tripartite electoral commission. Kissinger was edging closer and closer to Hanoi's views—except for the immediate removal of Thieu—and was laying the foundations for what would become the ultimate settlement.

The last discussion on Vietnam was conducted by Mr. Nixon and Brezhnev on May 30, the last day of the visit. They agreed that Podgorny would go to Hanoi as soon as possible to convey to the North Vietnamese the views Kissinger had expressed in Moscow. The precise nature of Podgorny's mission has thus far been kept secret, although his presence in Hanoi between June 15 and June 18 was publicly announced at the time. Kissinger was delighted that Podgorny would serve as an intermediary and he expressed pride to his associates that the Russians "are going to help us."

Kissinger in Peking

ON JUNE 16, while Podgorny was in Hanoi, Kissinger flew to Peking to brief the Chinese about the Moscow summit, as part of the American triangular policy. Vietnam was discussed for four hours in a meeting with Chou En-lai, and it was clear that Kissinger was keen on enlisting Chinese support for a negotiated settlement. For one thing, he was anxious to resume secret meetings

saying went. Whereas in Moscow Kissinger was acting as a negotiator, in Peking he was playing the philosopher with candor. He told Chou that if the Americans could be friends with China, they must also be friends with Hanoi.

The secret record shows that Kissinger told the Chinese premier that the trouble with the North Vietnamese was that they were too greedy, that they wanted everything at once, and that they were afraid of the process of history. He asked Chou En-lai why Hanoi was so afraid of history, and why it couldn't see the whole process as two separate stages? The first step, he said, would be the American disengagement. History would then run its own course in Vietnam.

Kissinger went on to complain that Hanoi kept asking the United States to do that which it was not prepared to do: namely, to overthrow a friend, the South Vietnamese, with whom Washington had already been fighting diplomatically so that the war could be ended. Kissinger, having propelled the Russians into a form of mediation, was now trying to obtain the same from the Chinese.

Chou En-lai, however, was less responsive. He told Kissinger that China would not press Hanoi one way or another, even though it did not necessarily approve of the North Vietnamese strategy of invading the South with conventional forces. He also volunteered the opinion that history was against the United States, that communism would prevail in Vietnam and Cambodia, but that Laos would continue to be ruled by its king.

Despite Chou's reticence about playing a diplomatic role in Vietnam, there are strong indications that China made a major contribution. Chairman Mao told French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, during July, that he advised Madame Binh, the Vietcong foreign minister, to desist from making demands for Thieu's resignation as a precondition. Mao informed Schumann that he had explained to Binh that in certain tactical situations a compromise is advisable. He gave her the example of his own negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek in the 1940s.

Schumann immediately informed the United States of his conversation with Mao, adding his own comment that a breakthrough might finally be in the offing. The White House took the view that Podgorny's and Mao's combined efforts, subtle as they were, held the promise of a settlement. By mid-July, there was a new sense of quiet optimism over the Vietnam negotiations. Hanoi had agreed to a secret meeting between Kissinger and Tho scheduled for July 19, and Kissinger felt that the negotiations might be getting back on the track.

The July 19 session produced no real results, as both sides basically rehashed their positions. Kissinger restated the October, 1971, proposal with the added incentive that the United States might shorten the deadline for the total withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam. But, importantly, the two sides agreed to keep in touch.

Promises to Thieu

AFTER HIS SESSION WITH THO, Kissinger flew directly to Saigon to practice a totally different brand of diplomacy with even greater problems. In talks with Thieu, he took a distinct tack from his approach to the Russians, the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. The emerging problem in Saigon was to prepare Thieu for a settlement.

The Kissinger line was thus to remind Thieu that a presidential election was approaching in the United States, that the administration must be forthcoming in its peace diplomacy, and that it must prevent Sen. McGovern from making it appear that Saigon was blocking the peace. Consequently, he said, the administration must, as a matter of political realities, come forth with seemingly attractive proposals knowing full well that Hanoi would reject them. Political risks had to be re-

Then, it appears, Kissinger proceeded to make extravagant promises to Thieu. After the elections, he allegedly told him, it would be a "different story." The United States would not hesitate to apply all its power to bring North Vietnam down to its knees. Kissinger recommended that Thieu start planning an invasion of North Vietnam after the elections. Specifically, he suggested ARVN landings in Vinh or Donghol. Thieu, who appeared nonplused by this idea, finally replied that if an invasion were mounted, Thanhhoa should be the prime objective. Actually, Thieu had been urging an invasion of North Vietnam as early as March, 1971, (during the Laos incursion), but could enlist no American encouragement and eventually dropped the idea. It was first revived by Gen. Haig in June, 1972, when he inquired of the commander of the ARVN First Corps whether an invasion of the North was feasible. When Kissinger reached San Clemente late in July, he told Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert who was reporting to Mr. Nixon on his latest survey in South Vietnam, that we would not be "bashful" after the elections.

It is, of course, hard to judge whether Kissinger was playing a complicated double game with the two Vietnamese factions, or whether he really believed that a final blow at Hanoi late in the year would leave the South Vietnamese in a strong enough military position to go along with the peace proposals he had in the works. He could have been deceiving Thieu, but, on the other hand, Kissinger always believed in giving Saigon a "decent interval" after a cease-fire—and this could only be achieved by crippling the North.

There was, to be sure, a certain logic in Kissinger's own evolving approach to the situation. The 1972 Communist spring offensive, if nothing else, had convinced him that the Vietnam war must be ended as soon as possible and the United States finally extricated from it. During the flight from Saigon to California, following his talks with Thieu, Kissinger mused in front of his staff that "we just can't let the Vietnam issue plague us for four more years." The problem, he said, had to be resolved between the November election and the President's anticipated second inaugural the next January.

It thus appeared that as early as July, Kissinger had the time sequence for an agreement firmly set in his own mind. He was optimistic that with quiet Soviet and Chinese support, and the stalling of the North Vietnamese offensive, Hanoi would meet him halfway before long—meaning a decision to wind up the conflict on the basis of the secret concessions Kissinger had just spelled out in Moscow and Peking, and without further North Vietnamese insistence on Thieu's elimination.

As he flew to San Clemente, Kissinger's problem was clearly to convince the President to accept this course of action and, simultaneously, to force Thieu to face reality and endorse the new American diplomatic stance. As for Mr. Nixon, Kissinger, as he put it, wanted to "lock him irrevocably into a decision" before the elections. Thieu was to be given maximum military advantage before the cease-fire. Kissinger told his aides on the plane over the Pacific, "One thing is for sure: we cannot stand another four years of this . . . So let's finish it brutally once and for all."

Going Without Thieu

PUSHING HIS SCENARIO with Hanoi, Kissinger held private talks with Tho in Paris on Aug. 1 and again on Aug. 15. Now that peace diplomacy was in high gear, the Kissinger-Tho meetings were being officially announced; but, by common agreement, none of the sub-

stance of their talks was revealed.

But Kissinger could go only so far without some form of concurrence from Thieu. After the Aug. 15 session in Paris, the point was reached where South Vietnamese acceptance of the tripartite commission and a quickened American withdrawal were required. Haig was now dispatched to Saigon to try to sell the new American package to Thieu.

Thieu was adamant. He told Haig that inasmuch as he controlled 90 per cent of South Vietnam (a claim the Americans tended to dispute in private), and the Vietcong could not expect to garner more than 10 or 20 per cent of the vote, he could not see why a tripartite commission was needed at all. Thieu, of course, was worried that such a commission would transform itself into a coalition government. Instead, he proposed a referendum in South Vietnam, to determine its political future. Haig reported to Washington that he could not break the deadlock with Thieu. But Kissinger wanted to maintain the momentum of negotiations and he arranged to meet secretly with Tho in Paris on Sept. 15.

First, however, Kissinger made another visit to Moscow. This visit was part of the new consultative process set up at the May summit. The three-day stay in the Soviet capital—Sept. 10 to 13—was devoted to a wide range of matters. Vietnam came up only on the last day, Sept. 13, at a session between Kissinger and his advisers and Brezhnev, Gromyko, Dobrynin and Alexandrov. Two days earlier, the Vietcong delegation in Paris had issued a fairly ambiguous new proposal that could have been read as meaning that, for the first time, a cease-fire would be acceptable without prior removal of Thieu. Kissinger was not certain that this was the breakthrough for which he had been waiting for three years; the Russians told him they thought it was.

Meanwhile, a stark and intense drama was developing behind the scenes. The plan was for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, in Saigon, to obtain Thieu's agreement to the tripartite commission, while Kissinger carried out his Moscow talks and prepared to meet Tho in Paris on Sept. 15. Kissinger was determined to present the North Vietnamese with a proposal on the tripartite body—agreed to by both Washington and Saigon—at their forthcoming session. But late at night on Sept. 13, after the talks with the Russians were finished, Kissinger, who was at the Dom Pryoma estate guest house, received a cable from Bunker advising that despite all the efforts in recent days, Thieu had rejected the tripartite commission proposal. An associate recounted later, "Henry blew a gasket." He said that he was perfectly capable of making it clear to Hanoi that there was a difference between a tripartite commission and a coalition government. Walking around the *dacha* at midnight, Kissinger briefly toyed with the idea of rushing to Saigon to try to change Thieu's mind, but concluded that the time had come for the United States to act unilaterally. It was too late in the negotiations to go back to Thieu, Kissinger told his associates. Shortly after midnight, he sent a telegram to Mr. Nixon, requesting permission to meet with Tho as planned and to inform him that Washington would stand firm on the question of the electoral commission regardless of Thieu's views. Kis-

singer's argument was, among other things, that with the elections at home only seven weeks away, the President could not risk a collapse in the peace negotiations.

Mr. Nixon's reply reached the American party the next morning, Sept. 14, as they prepared to leave for London. It said, in effect, that Kissinger could go ahead and tell Tho the next day that the United States accepted the tripartite commission. But this decision was not wholly popular in the White House: Haig, for example, complained privately to friends that Kissinger was giving away too much.

The Nixon-Kissinger decision was another major turning point in the tortured history of Vietnam negotiations. For the first time, Mr. Nixon was ready to make a major offer to Hanoi without Thieu's concurrence—in the face of his outright opposition.

The Stage Is Set

KISSINGER FLEW TO PARIS from London on Sept. 15, reverting to complex secrecy procedures. Kissinger spent the previous night at Claridge's and a State Department Vietnamese-language interpreter, urgently summoned from Washington, was put up at another hotel to maintain the cover. The interpreter met Kissinger at 6:30 a.m. in Claridge's lobby, and then the whole group was driven in a British military vehicle to the Royal Air Force's Bryce-Norton Base near London. There, they boarded a U.S. Air Force prop-driven twin-engined Convair plane for a choppy flight to the Villa Couleury field outside Paris. Kissinger's meeting with Tho and Thuy was relatively brief: He orally communicated the new American position and asked questions about the Vietcong document of Sept. 11. Tho, in turn, questioned Kissinger about modalities of presidential elections in South Vietnam after a cease-fire. This was, in a way, a preliminary step before the negotiations were to enter their final stage.

At a White House news conference on Sept. 16, the day after his return from Paris, Kissinger sounded a carefully optimistic note, though his audience, unaware of the substance of secret talks, was at an obvious disadvantage in trying to make sense of his remarks. He said, without elaboration, that the Sept. 11 Vietcong proposals left "something to be desired" in terms of his hopes for "bringing about a rapid conclusion of the war." Kissinger told newsmen that the "fact that these talks are going on would indicate a certain seriousness."

Kissinger returned to Paris for three meetings with Tho and, on Sept. 26, formally presented the American proposal for a tripartite electoral commission. Haig was simultaneously sent to Saigon to work on Thieu. Tho, who had received new instructions following his talks with Kissinger on Sept. 15, gave the impression of receptivity. Kissinger flew back to Washington, highly encouraged. He now felt, he told his associates, that there was a good chance that the "Vietnam cancer" could be removed before the November elections. His heart was not in the war; it endangered detente.

II. Breakthrough in Paris

THE LONG-ELUSIVE BREAKTHROUGH in the Vietnam peace talks finally came on Oct. 8. Kissinger, Haig and a large staff of advisers had arrived in Paris the previous day for the scheduled secret meeting. Late that afternoon, the Americans arrived at a villa owned by the French Communist Party in a Paris suburb, to be effusively greeted by Tho and Thuy. Then Tho presented Hanoi's *coup de theatre*.

Tho opened the conversation by saying that inasmuch as Kissinger was anxious to settle the war before the American elections, the North Vietnamese had brought a document to serve as the draft peace agreement. It was the first time Hanoi had presented a genuine negotiating document rather than just a series of demands.

The highlights of the Hanoi plan were an immediate cease-fire in place in Vietnam, a total U.S. withdrawal

from Vietnam, and the return of all the American POWs within 60 days. Politically, it proclaimed Vietnam — North and South—to be one country, temporarily divided. To bring about eventual unity, the North Vietnamese blueprint offered a vague political process in the South where an “administrative structure” would be in some way established prior to the elections. The document appeared to separate military from political issues—certainly not making a cease-fire contingent any more upon a political solution—and in this sense it met Kissinger's conceptual approach. Above all, Hanoi was no longer demanding Thieu's ouster as an *a priori* condition. Kissinger remarked that this was a “very interesting document inasmuch as they are separating the military from the political.”

Before the meeting adjourned, Kissinger indicated to Tho that he was willing to accept his document as the basis for subsequent negotiations. Accordingly, a new meeting was scheduled for the next day, Oct. 9. Returning to the American embassy residence, Kissinger instructed Winston Lord, John Negroponte and David Engel, his staff aides, to draft a counterproposal overnight. As it stood, he said, the Hanoi draft placed almost all the operational obligations on the United States and South Vietnam, and virtually none on North Vietnam, except to cease firing and return the POWs. Hanoi's troops were not expected to go home. One of Kissinger's ideas was that there should be a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord in Saigon in lieu of the vague “administrative structure.” The Council, not a coalition government, would operate alongside the Thieu regime and the electoral commission during the pre-election period.

Having instructed his staff to write the counterproposal, Kissinger went out to a restaurant with a date. The three men finished their work at 3 a.m. and went to sleep, leaving the document for Kissinger. But they were awakened by him at 8 a.m. He was furious; the draft was too hard-nosed. “You don't understand,” he said. “I want to meet their position.” He also wished to keep a number of issues open for further discussion. He gave his staff until 1 p.m. to revise the counterproposal along the lines he had indicated. An American official, familiar with the events of that week, said later that “Henry was rushing things too much; it was getting too sloppy.” Before going into the second meeting with Tho, at 3 p.m. on Oct. 9, Kissinger sent a two-paragraph telegram to Ambassador Bunker informing him very briefly of the situation and instructing him to tell Thieu. Trying to maximize his negotiating freedom on all fronts, Kissinger sent only scant reports on the situation to Saigon and even to Mr. Nixon.

Kissinger and Tho met daily on Oct. 9, 10 and 11, hammering out the language of the agreement. On Oct. 11, they reached an agreement in principle although two issues were left unresolved: the question of releasing civilian prisoners in South Vietnam (Kissinger did not want to press Thieu on this point), and the cessation of all military aid by the United States to South Vietnam and by North Vietnam to the Vietcong (and to the North Vietnamese regulars in the South) except on a one-to-one replacement basis. These two points were to prove to be among the most troublesome in subsequent talks. Kissinger told Tho that he now had to return to Washington to seek Mr. Nixon's approval before there could be another meeting on Oct. 17 to finalize the agreement. But Tho insisted on an understanding that the peace accord would be signed on Oct. 31.

The North Vietnamese, whose military fortunes in the South were declining, after their spring-summer successes, evidently wanted the signing before the election in the United States. They conveyed to the Americans their concern that after the election the President's position

might harden and the agreement, evidently favorable to them, might become unhinged. They obviously had premonitions about the future. Kissinger, who told Tho on six different occasions that Saigon's concurrence had to be obtained for the signing, related later that the North Vietnamese fought for the Oct. 31 date “almost as maniacally as they fought the war.” Anxious for a quick signing, Kissinger promised Tho to make a “major effort” to meet the deadline. Then he flew home, leaving Lord and Engel behind to keep liaison with the North Vietnamese.

On Oct. 12, Kissinger presented the 58-page draft agreement to Mr. Nixon, Rogers and several State Department experts, including William H. Sullivan, a deputy assistant secretary of state specializing in Indochina, and Deputy Legal Adviser George H. Aldrich. The CIA's George Carver was also brought in. The consensus was that the draft was basically acceptable, although a number of provisions had to be tightened.

The American public was unaware of how advanced the negotiations were. But Maurice Schumann, the French foreign minister, came to Washington around Oct. 15 to see Nixon and Kissinger. He had seen Tho in Paris a few days earlier and now he told four journalists, two American and two French, during an off-the-record round of drinks at the French embassy residence, that he had reasons to believe that a peace agreement was “within reach” if both parties wished to reach for it. Schumann, who complained that the Americans had been keeping him uninformed, had received a full briefing from the North Vietnamese and he spoke with more authority than the four journalists were prepared to accept. The Schumann story, which could not be attributed to him, was never written.

Thieu Balks Again

KISSINGER WAS NOW bubbling with optimism. He planned to return to Paris on Oct. 17 for a final meeting with Thuy (Tho had flown back home for last-minute consultations), and then go on to Saigon for wrap-up conferences with Thieu, between Oct. 19 and 23. Then he would fly secretly to Hanoi to initial the agreement on Oct. 24—his presence in the North Vietnamese capital would be revealed publicly only after the initialing ceremony—and the peace accord would be signed by the four foreign ministers in Paris on Oct. 31. The Hanoi trip would be Kissinger's greatest coup, and he was visibly excited about it. It was a beautiful scenario—except that Kissinger (despite warnings from the CIA's George Carver) had grossly overestimated his ability to bring Thieu around. This error was to plague him for months.

Kissinger arrived in Paris on the morning of Oct. 17 with Sullivan and Aldrich. They went immediately into session with Thuy, but it quickly developed that important textual differences remained between the two sides. The afternoon turned into evening. Kissinger, growing increasingly nervous and impatient, announced that he simply had to leave for Saigon that same evening before Orly Airport closed at 11 p.m. He was anxious to stay on schedule. Thuy told him that the final details presumably could be worked out in Hanoi after Kissinger arrived there from Saigon on Oct. 24. The North Vietnamese liked the idea of having Kissinger in Hanoi to wind up the talks and initial the accord in their capital.

Kissinger and Sullivan arrived in Saigon on the morning of Oct. 19. Nobody there had a clear idea of what was happening; Kissinger had made a point of keeping everyone in the dark. Bunker had not seen the text of the agreement, and was only vaguely aware of some of its provisions. Thieu knew next to nothing. But Kissinger was confident he could get his agreement in three days

of talks and then go on to Hanoi.

On Oct. 19, Kissinger and Bunker met for three and a half hours with Thieu at the presidential palace. For the first time, Thieu saw the draft peace agreement—and only in English version, which was all Kissinger had with him. He reacted with undisguised fury. His first objection was that he had not been consulted about the document that Kissinger proposed to initial in Hanoi three days hence. The text he was shown was still incomplete—the provisions for the release of civilian prisoners in the South and the question of military equipment replacements remained subject to further negotiations—but Thieu opposed most of the clauses that were written into it. His attitude was later described by a participant in the meeting as that of a “trapped tiger.” He said he was not ready for a cease-fire and that he could not understand why the Americans had given up their demands for an Indochina-wide cease-fire in favor of a truce confined to Vietnam alone. At the Oct. 19 meeting with Kissinger, and during sessions in the three ensuing days, Thieu claimed that the most important flaw in the proposed agreement was that the North Vietnamese were not required to leave the South. He protested that the document recognized post-truce areas of control in the South for both his forces and the Communists. This, he said bitterly, had the effect of granting the Communists sovereignty over some areas.

As the sessions at the palace grew increasingly tense—a participant said Thieu was acting almost paranoid—the Saigon leader accused Kissinger of negotiating an agreement behind his back and then demanding his endorsement of it in three days. He took exception to the concept of the tripartite commission and to the expression “administrative structure” which was still in the text despite Kissinger's preference for the Reconciliation and Concord Council. Either way, he said, this presaged a coalition government. Thieu saw his survival as South Vietnam's leader gravely threatened by the agreement Kissinger was trying to ram down his throat.

Kissinger (who by now had developed a hatred for Thieu) argued that the proposed agreement, combined with American guarantees, gave the Thieu regime a “fighting chance” and a “decent interval” after the cease-fire and the now inevitable U.S. withdrawal. He told Thieu: “We were successful in Peking, we were successful in Moscow, we were even successful in Paris. There is no reason why we cannot be successful here.” Thieu's young foreign policy adviser, Hoang Duc Nha, replied: “So far history has shown that the United States has been successful in many fields. But history does not predict that in the future the United States will be successful here.”

Still, Kissinger thought that Thieu would in the end be persuaded, and so advised Mr. Nixon from Saigon. Late on Oct. 21, Mr. Nixon, on Kissinger's recommendation, dispatched an extraordinary message to Hanoi, saying that despite a few remaining problems “the text of the agreement could be considered complete” and that peace could be signed on Oct. 31. The plan still was for Kissinger to go to Hanoi on Oct. 24.

While Kissinger kept negotiating with Thieu, he sent Sullivan to brief Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane and the Thai leaders in Bangkok. Sullivan told the Thais that as part of the peace agreement the North Vietnamese would withdraw from Laos and Cambodia. If Hanoi violated this commitment, he said, the United States would “obliterate” North Vietnam. This, however, was not entirely accurate. The United States never had a firm commitment from Hanoi on quitting Cambodia, although it had secret assurances that a Laos truce could be arranged, as indeed it was, a month after the Vietnam accord. Kissinger made a quick trip to Phnom Penh to confer with President Lon Nol, but he did not

show him the peace plan nor tell him Hanoi resisted a commitment on ending the Cambodian fighting. Instead, he pressed Lon Nol to seek a unilateral cease-fire. Lon Nol thanked him and asked when the North Vietnamese were leaving.

Kissinger and Bunker held their last meeting with Thieu on Oct. 23. Despite Kissinger's entreaties, Thieu remained totally opposed to the peace plan. Kissinger reported this to Mr. Nixon who, in turn, informed Hanoi that the Saigon talks had hit a snag and that, after all, the signing of the peace agreement could no longer be done on Oct. 31. Heavy-hearted, Kissinger canceled his Hanoi trip and, dejected and exhausted, flew back to Washington.

“Peace Is at Hand”

NOW A NEW CRISIS had developed. The North Vietnamese concluded that the Americans had used them for domestic political purposes and that they were reneging on the agreement reached in Paris earlier in the month. Their response was to “go public” with a broadcast on Oct. 25, disclosing the highlights of the agreement. The broadcast was monitored during the night by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a CIA operation) and Kissinger was awakened at 2 a.m. Oct. 26 to be told about it. He instantly telephoned the President at the White House. The two men met in the morning and a decision was made that Kissinger would hold a news conference at noon to explain the situation. Kissinger's overwhelming concern was that Hanoi not think that it was being deceived by the United States. With Mr. Nixon's specific approval, he thus used the now-famous expression that “peace is at hand” and that only a few more meetings with the North Vietnamese were required to iron out final details. The point was to reassure Hanoi, on one hand, and to warn Saigon, on the other, that the United States was determined to conclude a Vietnam peace agreement. Just as importantly, the statement served to undercut McGovern two weeks before the election.

Kissinger, in fact, was deeply concerned that his negotiations with the North Vietnamese would collapse because of Saigon's opposition. While still in Saigon, he had urged Mr. Nixon by cable on Oct. 23 to suspend American bombings north of the 20th parallel as a gesture of goodwill. He even suggested the end of U.S. tactical air support to the ARVN to show his annoyance with Thieu. Mr. Nixon agreed to halt the bombings in the North, but refused to cancel battlefield air support. The pressure on everyone involved was intense: before his return from Saigon to Washington Kissinger had a series of bitter cable exchanges with Haig, who thought that the American negotiating position was eroding.

At his televised performance in Washington on Oct. 26, Kissinger was, in effect, telling Hanoi to cool it, that the United States would deliver despite the unexpected delay. Some of Kissinger's colleagues say he did not believe at that point that peace was really “at hand,” but that he was both anxious to commit Mr. Nixon to a quick peace and to keep McGovern on the defensive. He seemed worried that after the elections the President might reopen the whole diplomatic situation; he feared that given Mr. Nixon's natural inclinations, the President might revert to toughness after being reelected.

Thus, as soon as the returns were in, Haig was dispatched to Saigon to discuss the “minimum changes” to be negotiated with Hanoi. Haig, who unlike Kissinger, was still on speaking terms with Thieu, told Thieu on Nov. 9 that he should not take too much comfort from the American elections. He warned him that although Washington would do its best to improve the terms, it would not give up its commitment for the tripartite electoral commission. Thieu reopened his objections to the draft language defining the areas of military control by

the two sides in South Vietnam and resisted anything that would bind him militarily. The North Vietnamese were overextended in the South at that stage—many of their units had not been advised to prepare for a cease-fire—and now Thieu was stalling while the ARVN tried to improve its position.

Kissinger returned to Paris on Nov. 20 for a new round of talks with Tho—to settle what he had said the previous month would be the final details. But, again, he miscalculated the situation. On Mr. Nixon's instructions, he convinced the North Vietnamese to include in the text a definition of the demilitarized zone as a provisional political division line. This was designed to pacify Thieu. Kissinger also read "for the record" a South Vietnamese document demanding 69 changes in the text. But the next day, Nov. 21, Kissinger retracted about one-half of these proposed changes. Kissinger said later that it was not conceivable that the North Vietnamese would have taken the South Vietnamese demands seriously. However, it was probably a mistake for him to have raised them so late in the game.

The talks dragged on for four more days and the Americans began detecting hesitations on Tho's part. Old questions were being asked again. Then, on Nov. 25, the North Vietnamese asked for an eight-day recess. Tho raced back to Hanoi.

On Dec. 4, Kissinger and Haig flew back to Paris. They found a new attitude on Tho's part. Kissinger's impression was that Hanoi had suddenly developed "cold feet" about the whole situation. Battlefield conditions were turning against the Communists while, at the same time, the United States was rushing some \$1 billion worth of new military equipment to South Vietnam under the name of Operation Enhance to beat the cease-fire deadline. F-5A jet fighter-bombers were being borrowed from South Korea, Nationalist China and Iran to beef up the South Vietnamese air force because it would take too long to get them from the United States. Hanoi's strategic doctrine called for a cease-fire only under optimal conditions; the North Vietnamese might be rethinking the entire agreement. Still, Kissinger kept negotiating with Tho despite the North Vietnamese on-and-off attitude toward parts of the agreement.

On Dec. 14, Tho told Kissinger that he had to go home for a few weeks to study the situation. Before leaving, he handed Kissinger the text of the protocol for implementing the cease-fire, including international supervision, which the Americans found totally unsatisfactory. The same evening, Kissinger flew back to Washington, still hopeful that an agreement was within reach.

Sullivan and William Porter, the chief American delegate to the semipublic negotiations, were left behind in Paris to continue technical talks with the North Vietnamese. On Dec. 15, when the two delegations met at the Neuilly-sur-Seine home of an American jeweler, the North Vietnamese proposed 16 changes in the text, reopening a part of the negotiations. Among other things, they now demanded that the release of the American POWs be conditional on the freeing of thousands of civilian prisoners held by Saigon. Until then, the matter of the Saigon prisoners had been left for negotiations to come after the truce between the two Vietnamese factions. Sullivan and Porter passed this on to Kissinger, who immediately ordered his staff to prepare a paper on Hanoi's "perfidy" to form the basis of his Washington press conference the next day.

A close study of the documents suggests, however, that the "perfidy" was somewhat exaggerated. Aside from the reopened question of the POWs, the differences between Hanoi and Washington were not all that great at that point. There was no agreement on the DMZ clause, nor had Hanoi yet agreed to replace the term "administrative structure" with "National Council for Concord and Reconciliation"—though these differences

alone hardly seemed to justify new bombings.

The Christmas Bombing

THE QUESTION, THEREFORE, arises: Why did the President feel impelled on Dec. 18 to order "Operation Linebacker II"—the bombing of Hanoi and the rest of North Vietnam? A theory held privately among many key officials is that he and Kissinger had decided, given the battlefield situation, that drastic action was necessary to discourage the pro-war faction in the North Vietnamese Politburo from forcing a reconsideration of the peace agreement. The Americans knew from intelligence sources that the October decision to go for a settlement carried by a small margin in the Hanoi Politburo. The White House feared that in a changed military context, the balance might shift in Hanoi in favor of the faction advocating more protracted warfare. As Kissinger put it, the United States was applying leverage against Hanoi to assist it in its decision-making process.

These officials believe that, in effect, the United States launched the Christmas bombing to force Hanoi to make "marginal decisions" about changes in the text of the agreement. One participant remarked at the time that "we are bombing them to force them to accept our concessions." The view of many officials, as this latest bit of brinkmanship developed, was that the POW question, and the disputes over the truce supervision mechanism and the National Council, could have been resolved without the bombings.

The administration realized that the bombings were not sustainable over an indefinite period, for international as well as domestic reasons. They were, therefore, a short-term proposition. This theory is borne out by the fact that on the day the bombings resumed, Haig flew to Saigon with a secret letter from Mr. Nixon urging Thieu to accept the settlement. Haig also told Thieu that, while the United States was "brutalizing" North Vietnam, it would sign a peace agreement if Hanoi would make a few changes in the text. He informed Thieu that if he remained adamant, he could no longer count on American assistance. On Dec. 21, Thieu handed Haig a letter for Mr. Nixon saying that he felt that he had been given an ultimatum and that he could not believe the President of the United States would deal in such a manner with an ally. When Kissinger read the letter, he commented bitterly: "All the Vietnamese parties are against us."

Evidently, Hanoi felt, early in January, that it had taken all the punishment it could take and proposed the resumption of the negotiations. Ironically, as the United States discovered from intercepted North Vietnamese tactical communications, Hanoi had only a two-day supply of SAM antiaircraft missiles on hand when the bombings stopped.

The meetings in Paris resumed on Jan. 7, 1973. The United States, in Kissinger's view, was now in an excellent position to obtain an agreement. Thieu was much more amenable to accepting the basic text in view of the Christmas bombings: his relative military position had improved. There is no known evidence that Kissinger had opposed the Christmas bombings (as he hinted to several liberal Washington columnists).

III. What Did We Agree On?

THE NEGOTIATIONS were concluded on Jan. 13, largely on American terms as conceived in a narrow mechanical sense. Kissinger seemed more interested in the technical modalities of the cease-fire provisions—once Hanoi reverted to its original position on the POWs—and gave the impression that he had lost interest in the political fate of the rest of Indochina. Kissinger also won his points on the Reconciliation Council.

He received a secret commitment that a Laos truce would follow a Vietnam agreement by 20 days—it was cut down from 30 days—but he pushed little for a pledge over Cambodia, although he was to insist publicly that he had received one. Hanoi also agreed to the DMZ clause and to a 2,500-man international supervisory force.

What American negotiators wanted most was a text with the maximum ambiguity of language so as to give the United States all the flexibility possible in supporting South Vietnam militarily after the truce. But they also entered into a series of secret and heretofore unpublicized agreements with Hanoi, most of them unfulfilled, presumably as a *quid pro quo* for ambiguities elsewhere.

The frame of mind of the Kissinger team, the secret commitments, and the deliberate ambiguities are well reflected in a secret State Department document entitled "Interpretations of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," prepared early in 1973 by George Aldrich, the deputy legal adviser.

The most important commitment concerns American civilian personnel working with the ARVN. In Aldrich's words:

"The United States has assured the DRV [North Vietnam] that we shall withdraw from South Vietnam within 12 months from the signature of the agreement all our civilian personnel 'working in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.' We have also assured the DRV that the majority of them will be withdrawn within 10 months. These assurances clearly cover all U.S. government employees whose principal duties are with GVN [South Vietnamese] armed forces. It is unclear whether it applies to U.S. nationals employed by contractors of either the United States or the GVN."

This commitment remains unfulfilled as of May, 1974—15 months after the signing of the agreement. There are an estimated 9,000 American civilians in South Vietnam, most engaged directly or indirectly in supporting the ARVN, especially in aviation.

In March, 1974, the United States began delivering to South Vietnam the first of 150 F-5E jet aircraft, a more sophisticated version of the F-5A planes borrowed during the war from Korea, Taiwan and Iran. The State Department paper expresses doubts as to whether such deliveries are not in violation of Article 7 of the agreement providing for a one-for-one replacement of used-up equipment. Under the agreement, replacements must be identical. The document argues that the return of the borrowed F-5As is the equivalent of being "used up," in terms of its availability to Saigon. But, it says, a "more difficult question is whether an F-5E can be a legitimate replacement for an F-5A." The paper concludes that "it seems obvious . . . that the GVN will have to be prepared to justify this replacement on the grounds of substantial similarity between the aircraft; if a decent argument cannot be made, the replacement

cannot be justified."

Although the agreement prohibits the movement of South Vietnamese warships in Communist-controlled areas, the State Department has provided an interpretation making it possible for Saigon's ships to escort convoys sailing up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh. This, the paper states, is "permissible if the GVN agrees that the ship channel remains an area under government control . . . this would be true even if areas of shore are clearly under PRG [Vietcong] control, but it is far from clear that the PRG would accept that interpretation . . ."

A major weakness in the agreement—the definition of the areas of control by the opposing parties in South Vietnam—is also spelled out in the State Department paper. It says that "we tried unsuccessfully to include in the cease-fire protocol an article making it clear that the Two-Party Joint Military Commission [South and North Vietnam] should base its determination on a census of military forces, including their location, strength, and deployment. The DRV refused to accept this concept and clearly preferred a political exercise of drawing lines on a map . . . The Commission is left with no guidance on how to determine the areas of control in South Vietnam."

Inasmuch as Article 5 of the agreement provides that American forces had to remove American military equipment from South Vietnam as part of the withdrawal, the United States hastily transferred title to much of it to the Saigon regime before the cease-fire became effective. But no determination was possible as to whether "transfer of title or transfer of possession is the critical act." Aldrich's analysis states that "we tried during the negotiations to lay a foundation for our theory that transfer of title was adequate . . . but we decided that we could not make this explicit without running an unacceptable risk that the North Vietnamese would object and make the issue a major one in the negotiations . . . On the basis of the language and the absence of any relevant negotiating history, we can make a reasonable case, but we must recognize that it is far from compelling . . ."

Among American commitments made public during the peace negotiations was the promise of economic aid for the reconstruction of North Vietnam. A joint American-North Vietnamese economic committee began meeting in Paris shortly after the signing of the peace agreement. In the light of congressional criticism, however, the administration made it known that it was impossible to reach an accord with Hanoi.

It is a fitting footnote to this whole extraordinary history that the administration chose to misrepresent the state of affairs concerning the economic talks.

Thus a top-secret telegram was sent to Washington on March 27, 1973, by Maurice J. Williams, the principal American negotiator, reporting that a virtually complete agreement had been reached on operating procedures to govern the provision of U.S. aid to North Vietnam. The single unresolved point, Williams stated, involved how the North Vietnamese were to report on how the aid would be used. The administration, deciding to drop the whole project for political reasons, never made public the fact that the United States had been one step away from a bilateral accord with Hanoi.

IV. A Few Conclusions

LOOKING BACK at the saga of Kissinger's Vietnam peace diplomacy, one must ask whether he could have negotiated a settlement better and sooner than he did. The related question is whether Mr. Nixon would have allowed him to do so. Granting the dangers of second-guessing recent history, the following points can be made on the basis of what is now known of the Vietnam negotiations:

- Agreement with Hanoi was probably possible in December, 1972, without the final paroxysms of the Christmas bombing. The differences between the October, 1972, and January, 1973, texts do not appear to be sufficiently substantive to justify the death and destruction wrought by American planes—not to mention American losses. One is left with the impression that Mr. Nixon and Kissinger took advantage of Hanoi's political hesitations in December, 1972, to inflict the greatest possible damage on North Vietnam so that Thieu would be able to accept the agreement.

- The Christmas bombings, therefore, were designed to induce Thieu to sign the Paris agreement, the price being the "brutalizing" of the North. But, at the same time, this was the price that had to be paid for Kissinger's miscalculation of Thieu's responses to the September and October, 1972, proposals on which he was never adequately, if at all, consulted. Failure to consult allies seems to be a Kissinger hallmark. Had Kissinger been more open and forceful with Thieu in August, 1972, much grief and tragedy might have been avoided.

- In all fairness to Kissinger, it must be recognized that a settlement, as distinct from an American cave-in which Mr. Nixon would not have tolerated, became possible only in October, when Hanoi and the Vietcong dropped their demand that Thieu be ousted as a *sine qua non* of peace. It may also be posited that they would not have done so at all if their spring offensive had been more successful and if Moscow and Peking had not brought pressure, subtle or otherwise, to bear on the North Vietnamese to accept a compromise.

- But the obverse of this argument is that Hanoi might have been ready earlier for such a compromise if Kissinger had not waited until the spring of 1972 to tell the Russians that the United States no longer, in effect, insisted on the evacuation of North Vietnamese troops from the South and that it would go for a politi-

logjam was broken diplomatically by Kissinger's two Moscow performances in 1972, emphasizing, among other things, that the Soviets and then the Chinese were able to play a greater role in the achievement of the peace than Washington had given them credit for. The unanswered question is whether Hanoi would have launched the March, 1972, offensive if it had known that Kissinger would, within less than two months, dramatically alter his secret diplomacy.


- It must have been predictable from the very outset—from the time the first bombing halt was negotiated in 1968—that the North Vietnamese would never leave the South. Other than the effort at Vietnamization, therefore, there is no satisfactory reason for Kissinger to have refused to recognize reality for three years. The massive American intervention in 1972 and the continuing military support for Saigon suggest that Vietnamization had fallen short of expectations.

- It is remarkable—and instructive—to note the extremely close parallels between the negotiations of 1972 and the U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations of 1968 concerning the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. While the story is too lengthy to describe here, the structure of the two negotiations was virtually identical, right down to the exact date on which the North Vietnamese demanded the agreement: each time, it was Oct. 31. The breakdown in communications with Thieu was also a replay of what had happened in 1968. In both cases, it would appear that the critical factor as far as timing was concerned was the impending presidential election.

- This negotiation story offers a unique insight into the brilliance, stamina and tactics of Henry Kissinger. This does not necessarily mean that no one else could have done it, but it is instructive to follow his steps—including his mistakes and deceptions—through the minefields of Paris and Hanoi, Saigon and Washington. Concealment—partial or complete—was an essential part of his policy. Others will find in this story many additional insights into the way Kissinger operated.

- A year and a half after the Paris signings, Thieu remains in power, which on the surface bolsters Mr. Nixon's assertion that we have "peace with honor" in Vietnam. But the other side of the coin is that Thieu cannot survive without continuing American support. The steady Communist pressure on the ARVN and the likelihood of a new offensive this year already led the administration, late in March, to ask Congress for \$500 million to \$525 million in additional military and economic aid to Saigon during this year. In fact, the Pentagon has warned that unless \$474 million in new aid comes rapidly, the ARVN might have to curtail operations.

- The fact is that as long as the United States supports the Thieu government in any major way, and as long as the pressure to remove that government continues from Hanoi, there will be a continuing conflict with the potential to escalate again into an international issue. Thus, Vietnam remains a threat to detente, even if it is a diminished one. This was evident when the Soviet Union, for the first time in over a year, issued statements in mid-April criticizing the United States for its Vietnam policies. It was a familiar warning shot across the bow. An ominous echo, raising the memories of earlier letters from earlier eras, was Kissinger's letter to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy explaining the nature of the continuing American obligation to Nguyen Van Thieu. Some problems, it seems, just won't go away.



Oliphant in the Denver Post

cal deal on the basis of the tripartite commission. The